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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Does

the

evidence

support

a

finding

that

Elsie

Brinkerhoff has been incompetent since 1970, and if so, does
the evidence support a finding that all documents signed by her
thereafter should be canceled and declared to be null and void?
2.

What is the legal effect of the fact that during the

first day of trial, the court determined that the interests of
Elsie Brinkerhoff were not being fully protected by her legal
counsel, Willard R. Bishop, that she needed separate counsel to
represent

her

interests,

and

that

the

court

thereafter

continued

the trial without obtaining counsel to represent

Elsie Brinkerhoff during the course of the trial?
3.

Assuming the incompetency of Elsie Brinkerhoff in

1970, does the record support a finding that Elsie Brinkerhoff
thereafter remained incompetent, including the years 1979, 1980
and 1982 when she signed documents of conveyance?
4.

Did the 1966 contract terminate by operation of lav/,

abandonment, rescission or mutual agreement by reason of the
buyers' failure tc make payments thereunder from 1966 through
1971 and thereafter executing documents of conveyance?
5.

Does the fact that Plaintiffs failed to tender at the

time of trial the $30,000 that they acknowledged to be due and
owing, prohibit the trial court from granting a Decree of
Specific

Performance

incompetent person.

under

the

contract

and

against

an

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This

is

an

appeal

by

Defendants/Appellants,

Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff and Arlene B. Goulding

Golda

B.

(hereinafter

"Defendants") from a judgment rendered after a trial on the
merits by the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, District Court Judge of
the Sixth Judicial District Court in and for Kane County, State
of Utah, dated February 20th, 198 6.

The judgment was in favor

of Plaintiffs, Mont R. Anderson, Lena Brinkerhoff and Mark J.
Brinkerhoff

(hereinafter "Plaintiffs") and against Defendants

specifically enforcing a 1966 contract and allowing Plaintiffs
to make up past due payments

of principal

and

interest

in

excess of $50,000 of an original contract wherein the total
purchase price was

$53,388, without

also

documents

voided

all

interest.

signed

by

The

judgment

Defendant

Elsie

Brinkerhoff, including those running in favor of Defendants.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
THE PARTIES
Plaintiff,
representative
known

as

Mont
of the

"Tine"

R.

Anderson,

estate

of Cloyd

Brinkerhoff.

Plaintiff, Lena Brinkerhoff.
the

partnership

Brinkerhoff.

consisting

Lena

He

is

the

personal

H. Brinkerhoff, also

is

the

son-in-law

of

He was also the accountant for
of

Mark

Brinkerhoff

was

Brinkerhoff
married

to

and

Cloyd

Cloyd

Brinkerhoff at the time of his death in October of 1979.

H.
Mark

J. Brinkerhoff is the son of Elsie Brinkerhoff and the brother2

in-law of Lena Brinkerhoff.
Mark,

Cloyd,

Golda

B.

Elsie Brinkerhoff is the mother of

Adair,

Warren

("Tink")

Brinkerhoff,

Arlene B. Goulding, Charles Brinkerhoff and Betty B. Esplin.
Defendant, Golda B. Adair is married to Webster Adair.
are the parents of Brad Adair.

They

Webster Adair and Plaintiff,

Lena Brinkerhoff, are brother and sister.
THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION
The real property which

is the subject of this action

consists of 1,956.17 acres of grazing ground, and 18.01 acres
of farm ground.

The property

is located north and east of

Glendale, Kane County, Utah, and has been in the Brinkerhoff
family for many years.
an

appraised

Brinkerhoff
husband,

At the time of trial the property had

value

of

received

the

Merle

$409,999.
property

Brinkerhoff.

The

(Exhibit
from

the

37).
estate

Brinkerhoff

Elsie
of

property

her
also

consists of some water rights in the Arizona Strip area and
additional grazing and water rights.
FACTS
After Elsie Brinkerhoff

received

the property

from her

husband's estate, she entered into an agreement in 1966 betv/een
herself as the seller and her sons, Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and
Mark

Brinkerhoff,

as

buyers.

(Exhibit

1,

attached).

The

contract was prepared by Ken Chamberlain, Attorney at Law, of
Richfield, Utah.

The contract requires the buyers

(Mark and

Cloyd) to pay to seller (Elsie) minimally the sum of $53,388,
3

at the rate of $2,000 per year for her life without interest
and is an annuity contract based on the life expectancy of
Elsie who was 65 years old at the time the contract was entered
into.

The contract required that an escrow be established and

that deeds be deposited in the escrow.

Only some of the deeds

required by the 1966 contract were deposited into escrow, and
the location or existence of all the original deeds was never
established.

The escrow, as per the agreement, was to be

established in the Hurricane Branch of the Bank of St. George.
In the event of a default, the contract does not require
the seller to provide notice to the buyer of the default, but
simply allows the seller to demand a redelivery to her of all
the escrow documents, thus requiring the buyer to vacate and
peaceably

surrender

contract, with

all of

the property

all sums paid

liquidated damages.

described

to date to be

in the

forfeited

as

The contract only requires prior notice

for a default of the contract other than payment of principal
and interest, and in that event, the buyer has a thirty (30)
day grace period.

However, as to payment of principal and

interest, no prior written notice to cure is required.
The contract also provides that the buyers are entitled to
possession

of

the

subject

property

only

if

they

are

in

compliance with the terms of the agreement, including payment
of principal and interest.

(Exhibit 1).

Even though the contract was not signed until 1966, an

4

annual payment for both 1964 and. 1965 was required under the
contract. The trial court gave the buyers credit for these two
annual payments inasmuch as the contract recites that the
seller therein acknowledged payment of the same.
The court found that all payments were made outside the
escrow and that payments should have been made from 1964 in the
sum of $2,000 per year.

Including the 1985 payment, the court

found that principal payments should have totaled $44,000 (22
years at $2,000 per year) , and the court, even though the
contract waives interest, assessed interest.

The court found

that

had

from

1964

through

trial,

Plaintiffs

$14,996.75 of the $44,000 which was due.
paid,

$4,000

was

paid

after

the

only

paid

Of the $14,996.75

litigation

was

filed.

(Findings of Fact, No. 9, attached, R. 633). The court found
that payments were made as follows:
Date Paid
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974

$

Amount

Date Paid

2,000.00
2,000.00
-0-0-0-0-0-01,210.75
1,780.00
500.00

1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982

$

SUBTOTAL:

$ 10,996.85

Amount
1,100.00
400.00
-0-02,006.00
-0-0-0-

1983 (after
litigation
filed)

2,000.00

1984 (after
litigation
filed)

2,000.00

TOTAL PAID AT TIME OF TRIAL:

$ 14,996.75

5

The trial court found that Mark Brinkerhoff and the estate
of

Cloyd

Brinkerhoff

were

indebted

to

Brinkerhoff, in the sum of $50,262.95
allowed

their

mother,

including

Elsie

interest and

them to reinstate the contract upon payment of said

amount.
From
$28,000.

(Finding of Fact No. 13, R. 638).
1964

through

1977,

Elsie

should

have

been

paid

During that period of time, the court found that she

was only paid

$8,990.75, or thirty-two

(32%) percent of the

amount the trial court found was due and owing.

Of significance

is the fact that in 1977, Cloyd deceived his mother and had her
sign a receipt stating that she had received $23,000 (Exhibit 4,
attached) , even

less

than

one-third of the amount owed at that time had been paid.

(Tr.

208-209) .

though

he

knew

in

reality

that

Cloyd was told by Mont Anderson, a Certified Public

Accountant, that he needed evidence that payment in that amount
had been made, presumably

to insulate himself

attack by the Internal Revenue Service.
From

1966

through

1979, Mark

and Mark

from

(Tr. 208).

and

Cloyd

operated

as

a

partnership and have filed income tax returns as a partnership
for

that period

of

time.

(Exhibits

26

and

39, Partnership

Accounting Records; Tr. 96; 165). Cloyd died on October 14th,
1979 of a sudden heart attack.
Plaintiff

Mont

R.

Anderson,

is

a

Certified

Public

Accountant as well as the personal representative of the estate
of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff.

Mr. Anderson tried to convince the

6

trial court that Plaintiffs should have received credit for
$38,012,34

(Tr. 166; Exhibit 22), under" highly questionable

accounting practice, but even assuming that amount of credit, he
testified that the sum of $15,000 was still past due and owing.
At trial, Mark testified he owed his mother about $30,000 but
had never offered to pay her any amount toward the past due
payments.

(Tr. 90-91, Tr. 166-167) .

None of the Plaintiffs,

prior to or at the time of trial, tendered to the court or Elsie
Brinkerhoff any amount of arrearage, and specifically not the
sum of $30,000 that even Plaintiffs acknowledged was due and.
owing.
In 1979 Mont Anderson recommended that Cloyd consult with
an attorney in Nevada to get his affairs in order (Tr. 221), and
Cloyd consulted with a law firm in Las Vegas, Nevada where
Plaintiff Mont Anderson, resides.

At the same time, Mont R.

Anderson, recommended to Cloyd that he obtain a deed for the
subject property and get it recorded.

(Tr. 220) .

that Cloyd was having this legal work done.

Mark knew

(Tr.. 119) .

Apparently, someone suggested to Cloyd that he have a joint
tenancy

deed

prepared

between

his mother, himself

brother, Mark, for the subject property.

and his

Some time prior to

June of 1979, Cloyd contacted Brad Adair (Elsie's grandson) who
was employed by Southern Utah Title Company in Kanab, Utah.
Cloyd

asked Brad Adair

to prepare

a deed

for the

subject

property from Elsie as the grantor to Elsie, Cloyd, and Mark as

7

joint tenants.

(Tr. 434-441).

Brad complied with that request,

took the deed to Elsie who signed the same and Brad notarized
her signature.

(Exhibit 5, attached) .

At the same time, Brad

Adair also prepared another deed from Elsie to her son Charles,
for property not related to the subject property.

These two

deeds were recorded one right after the other in the official
records Of Kane County, Utah.

(Tr. 434-444; see also Exhibit

19, Entry Book, Recorder's Office, Kane County, Utah).

The cost

of

paid

$18.00

to

record

the

joint

tenancy

deed

was

by

partnership funds (Exhibits 19 and 39; see discussion, infra).
Mr. Adair also testified that he believed his grandmother, Elsie
Brinkerhoff, was competent on June 4th, 1979 and likewise in
1980.

(Tr. 447-448) .
While

Mark

Brinkerhoff

denied

having

knowledge

of

the

preparation and recordation of the joint tenancy deed, it is
obvious that both Cloyd and Mark were anticipating that their
aged

mother, Elsie, would predecease them and title would be

vested in them as the surviving joint tenants.

As sometimes

happens, the events did not occur as anticipated, and on October
14th, 1979, just four months after the execution and recordation
of the joint tenancy deed, Cloyd Brinkerhoff died of a sudden
heart attack.
in

1979, Elsie

Within three or four months after Cloyd's death
gave Mark

a copy

of the

joint

tenancy

deed

(Tr.118), but Mark took no action to have it set aside until
1982 when this lawsuit was filed naming him as a Defendant.

8

In

1979

record

title was vested

in Elsie

Brinkerhoff

and Mark

Brinkerhoff each with an undivided one-half interest.
At the beginning of trial and when he testified, Mark took
the position that he was entitled to a one-half interest in the
subject property either by reason of the joint tenancy deed, or
the 1966 Contract of Sale.

(Tr. 104; 131). He essentially had

nothing to lose by taking that position.

Of significance is the

fact that Mark has always recognized the validity of the joint
tenancy deed.

It is evident that he and his sister-in-law, Lena

Brinkerhoff, had trouble over the ownership of the property by
reason of that claim.

(Tr. 112). This is evidenced by the fact

that in the original complaint, Lena brought suit against Mark
J. Brinkerhoff, Elsie Brinkerhoff and the remaining children as
named Defendants, to cancel the joint tenancy deed that Mark and
the other family members were relying on.

(R. 1-8 Complaint;

R.351-370 Seconded Amended Complaint).
Both before and after Cloyd's death, it was evident to the
other family members that their mother, Elsie Brinkerhoff, was
not being paid the sum of $2,000 per year, and that she had not
been paid that amount for many years.

(Tr. 276).

Some of the family members knew of the joint tenancy deed
so after Cloyd's death, a family meeting was called.

Since it

was evident at that time that Elsie could not rely upon the
$2,000 annual payment she was supposed to be receiving from her

9

two eldest sons, Defendants Golda, Warren, Arlene, Charles and
Betty talked with their mother and they decided upon a method
whereby Elsie would be guaranteed a minimum sum per month to
supplement her social security payment by selling her one-half
interest to these five children.

(Tr. 277; 288).

The five brothers and sisters agreed that they could each
afford to pay Elsie $30.00 per month, and Elsie would therefore
receive the sum of $150.00 per month, or $1,800 per year, to
supplement to her social security payment.
Brad Adair, at Southern Utah Title, was asked to research
the status of the title of the subject property.
He,

of

course, knew

that

the

joint

tenancy

deed

(Tr. 445) .
had

been

recorded in June of 1979, and confirmed that no other deeds were
of record.

He prepared an affidavit for Elsie to sign to sever

the joint tenancy, which she did, and the joint tenancy was
severed

by

the

recordation

of

the

affidavit

and

death

certificate.

However, the joint tenancy was not severed until

August

1980, or

15th,

Brinkerhoff.

ten months

after

the

death

of Cloyd

(Exhibit 21). Prior to the execution of any other

documents, Brad Adair inquired of his grandmother as to whether
or not she wanted to deed the other one-half interest to her
five children.

The following is an excerpt from his testimony

Q.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Did you prepare the deed from
your grandmother to the five children for her
one-half interest?

A.

MR. ADAIR:

Yes, I did.

10

Q. And did you discuss that with your grandmother?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And describe that discussion, if you will?
A.

Well it took quite awhile for her to decide that
this is the way she wanted to go, you know, so
that she would get the money and the other five
children would have something also, and so I did
go ahead and prepare the document and the way I
remember, I took them to my mother's home, I left
them there, and I discussed this several times
with my grandma.

Q.

What did you discuss with grandma on these
several occasions?

A.

Well I told her what the effect of it would be,
you know, and also that if the joint tenancy deed
held and if she died Mark would have all the
property and that, you know, under that she would
be conveying her interest to the other five
children, that in turn would receive $30.00 a
month each from the other five children.

Q.

Did she appear to understand that transaction?

A.

Yes she did.

Q.

Did she at any time tell you she didn't want to
deed her one-half interest?

A.

No.

(Tr. 446-447) .

Elsie then executed a deed from herself to Golda, Warren,
Arlene, Charles and Betty, each as to an undivided one-fifth
interest for the one-half ownership she still maintained in the
subject property.

(Exhibit 6, attached).

Mark Brinkerhoff, of

course, owned the other one-half interest by reason of the 1979
joint tenancy deed.
At the request of these five children and with Elsie's
understanding, Brad Adair also prepared

11

a separate Trust Deed

Note

for

each

to

sign.

These notes were

for

$10f 000 eachf

payable at the rate of $30.00 per month and were secured by a
Trust Deed on the property deeded by Elsie.

The Trust Deed was

signed by all five children evidencing a total obligation to
Elsie in the sum of $50,000.

(Exhibit 7, Trust Deed and Exhibit

20, Trust Deed Note and Escrow Agreements) .
children

also

signed

an

Escrow

Each of these five

Agreement

designating

the

Orderville Branch of State Bank of Southern Utah as the escrow
depository to receive the $30.00 per month payment from each
child.

The Trust Deed was thereafter recorded and the escrow

established.

Payments

were made

by

the

five

children

on a

regular basis, and have been paid by Defendants, Golda Adair,
Arlene B. Goulding, and Warren Brinkerhoff, each and every month
since September 1980.

(Exhibit 14, ledger sheet from State Bank

of Southern Utah).
Since 1981 the taxes have been paid by both Plaintiffs and
Defendants

based

on

county

ownership

records

and

Mark

specifically knew that he had been paying only one-half of the
taxes and that his five brothers and sisters claimed ownership
of one-half of the property.

(Tr. 115).

Prior to Cloyd's death in 1979, the last payment made to
Elsie on the 1966 contract was a $400.00 payment in December of
1976.

(Finding of Fact 9, R. 632).

After Cloyd's death in

October of 1979, Mark became concerned that the true facts would
surface and it would become known that he had not been paying

12

his

mother

as

questions.

promised,

and

Lena

was

apparently

asking

In November of 1979, Mark deposited directly into

his mother's account, the sum of $706.00.

(Exhibit 15).

On December 8, 1980, Mark tendered to Elsie a check in the
sum

of

$2,000,

contract.

apparently

in

an

attempt

to

reinstate

This payment was refused by Elsie.

(Tr. 81) .

the
On

October 14,, 1981, Mark and Lena again tendered a check in the
sum of $2,000 to Elsie and that tender was likewise refused by
Elsie.

(Tr. 107, Exhibit 17). These payments were rejected by

Elsie because she knew she had deeded her one-half interest in
the property to her five children, that she was receiving money
from

them

and

that

Mark

already

owned

the

other

one-half

interest in the property by reason of the joint tenancy deed and
Cloydfs subsequent death.

It only seems logical that Elsie felt

the partnership operated by Mark and Cloyd

was only entitled to

a one-half interest in the property - they had paid far less
than

one-half

of

the

payments

due

to

her

through

1980

($10,996.75 paid of $28,000 due and owing).
On June 21st, 1982, an action was filed by Lena, against
Elsie, Mark,

and

the

five

other

brothers

and

sisters.

On

November 1st, 1982, Mark again tendered a check in the sum of
$2,000,

but

that

payment

was

likewise

refused

by

Hans

Q.

Chamberlain, who at that time represented Elsie Brinkerhoff.
After this litigation arose and an Answer and Counterclaim
had been filed on their behalf, Charles Brinkerhoff and Betty
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Esplin decided that in the interests of family harmony, they did
not want to participate in the litigation.

At that time they

deeded their one-fifth interest of the one-half interest they
received from Elsie, to Mark and Lena (Exhibits 9 and 10) , who
by that time had entered into an agreement between themselves to
evidence a unified front.
Therefore, at the time of trial, the record title indicated
that

Mark

interest,

owned
Golda

a
a

six-tenths
one-tenth

interest,
interest,

Lena

a

one-tenth

Arlene

a

one-tenth

court

committed

interest, and Warren a one-tenth interest.
Since

Defendants

claim

that

the

trial

reversible error when it determined that Elsie Brinkerhoff has
been incompetent since 1970, it is important for this court to
understand how the issue of competency
trial.

arose at the time of

As discussed in more detail, below, the issue of Elsie's

competency

was

not raised

by Plaintiffs

in their

complaint,

amended complaint, discovery, or in the pretrial order prepared
by

Plaintiffs'

maintained

that

counsel.
Elsie

Likewise,
was

Defendants

competent

until

have
she

always

signed

a

Stipulation on September 9th, 19 8 4 when she was not represented
by counsel.

Likewise, in this appeal, Elsie Brinkerhoff is not

represented by counsel.

Even though the trial court appointed

Kirk Heaton, Attorney at Law, Kanab, Utah, as the guardian of
Elsie Brinkerhoff, he has apparently elected not to participate
in this appeal on Elsie's behalf.

14

On the first day of trial, Elsie Brinkerhoff was called by
Plaintiff, but not until Defendants1 counsel cross-examined her
did the court sua sponte, raise the issue of her incompetency.
On August 13, 1983, Elsie requested the undersigned, Hans
Q. Chamberlain, who initially represented, to withdraw as her
attorney of record as per a document prepared by Mark's son,
Dale Brinkerhoff.

(Exhibit 11) .

Said attorney did withdraw,

and did not see Elsie again until her deposition was taken on
February

11th,

1985, ten days

prior

to trial.

Because

the

undersigned noticed a significant change in her mental condition
at

the

time

of

deposition,

and

because

she

had

signed

a

Stipulation prepared when she was unrepresented by counsel on
September 9th, 1984, the following dialogue took place at the
time of trial:
Q. MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Now before we go to that,
let me just ask you a couple of these questions; are
you represented by an attorney in this case?
A.

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF;

No.

Q.

You're not?

A.

No.

Q.

Alright.

A.

I never had to have an attorney for anything.

Q.

Were you represented by me on one occasion?

A. Well until I called you or sent word to you
that I didn't want to be in on it anymore.
Q. Alright. So right now you don't think you
are represented by an attorney?
A. No.
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Q. Do you know that you are being sued in this
lawsuit today?
A, No. I've heard about it, but I don't know
anything about it.
Q.

You don't know that you're being sued?

A. No. I asked Lena what I was being sued forf
and she said I wasn't being sued.
Q. Did you ever ask Lena why she sued you in the
first place?
A.

No, I never have.

I don't know why.

Q. Okeh. When you testified at this deposition
that we took were you represented by an attorney?
A.
You were the only one I have ever had
anything to do with, 'til we got in with this Mr.
Bishop there.
Q.

Okey.

So does Mr. Bishop represent you now?

A.
I don't know whether he does nor not. I
never asked him. He never told me anything about it
so —
Q.

Alright.

THE COURT;

Do you represent her Mr. Bishop?

MR, BISHOP;
I do, your Honor.
I received a
letter on the 16th of October from Mrs. Brinkerhoff
asking me to do so. It looks like her signature on
the other documents I've seen.
THE COURT;
Q.

Did you

She doesn't know that she asked you.
—

THE COURT;
Go ahead.
interests. How's that.

I will

look

after her

Q. Did you ever write to Mr. Bishop and ask him
to represent you?
A.

No.
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Q.

If you'd give me a minute, okeh?

A.

Sure, go ahead.

Q. Mrs. Brinkerhoff, would you turn to Page 11.
I'm sorry, let's go to Page 11. Can I help you there
just a little?
A.

Well —

THE COURT; Let me just make a record at this
point: The record shall indicate that the Court is of
the opinion that Mrs. Brinkerhoff should have
representation, but because of the timing of this
matter, that the Court will look after her interests
and I'm not going to hold up the trial for the purpose
of bringing in independent counsel and the Court will
attempt to look out after her interests, but it's the
Court's opinion that she does not fully understand the
consequences of the matter before the Court, and she
has not and the Court finds she is not fully
understood at this point and for a considerable period
of time, but the Court will allow the proceedings to
go forward and the Court will try to look out for her
interests, but at the same time, reserves the right to
stop the proceedings if I feel that her interests are
not (sic) being abused.
I'm making that so that there's no question on
the record why I am doing what I am doing, but I think
that in the interest of judicial economy, I should go
forward with the proceedings.
You* may proceed
counsel. (Tr. 345-348).
Because the trial court ruled early in the trial that Elsie
had been incompetent "for a considerable period of time," and
without

any

evidence

presented

by

Plaintiffs

concerning

competency (apparently relying only upon the testimony of Elsie
Brinkerhoff at time of trial) , Defendants were put in the
position of having to rebut the finding by the trial court that
Elsie was incompetent when she executed the joint tenancy deed
in 1979, and the deed from herself to her five children in 1980.

17

After that finding by the trial court, each witness, including
both

Plaintiffs' and Defendants1, was

Elsie was
answered

competent

in

1979

without hesitation

and
that

in

asked

1980, and

she was

(See discussion under Point I, below).

if they

in

each

thought
witness

fact competent.

The trial court's ruling

that Elsie became incompetent in 1970 was clearly contrary to
all evidence presented.

HOW THE PARTIES WERE INITIALLY REPRESENTED, THE CHANGES
THAT OCCURRED DURING DISCOVERY AND THE TRIAL ITSELF,
AND THE INCONSISTENCY IN PLAINTIFFS' POSITION
When this action was filed on June 22, 1982, Lena, acting
through

the

personal

representative

of

the

estate

of

Cloyd

Brinkerhoff, sued Elsie, Mark, Golda, Warren, Arlene, Charles
and Betty, seeking to specifically enforce the 1966 contract and
cancel all other deeds executed by Elsie.

(R. 1-8, 351-170).

Defendants1 attorney herein, Hans Q. Chamberlain, was initially
contacted personally by Elsie, Golda, Warren, Arlene, Charles
and Betty.

An extensive Answer and Counterclaim was prepared on

behalf of those parties, including Elsie Brinkerhoff, alleging,
in part, (1) forfeiture under the 1966 contract, (2) a request
for an accounting

from her two sons who signed the purchase

agreement, and (3) damages for conversion of personal property.
(R.

16-27) .

Interrogatories

Defendants to Plaintiffs.

were

thereafter

submitted

by

On August 13th, 1983, Elsie requested

that she did not want to remain a party
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to the action and

requested that her attorney, Hans Q. Chamberlain, withdraw,
which he did.

(Exhibit 11) .

However, Elsie was advised in

writing that she was still a party litigant to this lawsuit and
that she should have other counsel.
Elsie

Brinkerhoff

thereafter

(Exhibit 6, attached).

remained

unrepresented

until

Willard R. Bishop, the attorney who had sued her in the first
instance, entered an appearance on her behalf and did so on
February 14th, 1985 one week prior to trial.

(R. 421-426) .

However, prior to that time, on September 7th, 1984, Willard R.
Bishop, as attorney for Mont R. Anderson, Lena and Mark prepared
a Stipulation (Exhibit 40, attached), which Elsie signed.
Stipulation

(1) reaffirms the 1966 contract,

That

(2) repudiates

other deeds signed by Elsie, (3) waives all delinquent amounts
owed to her and (4) dismissed the Counterclaim filed by Hans Q.
Chamberlain on behalf of Elsie against Mark J. Brinkerhoff and
Cloyd's estate.

After the Stipulation was signed by Elsie, a

copy was submitted by Plaintiffs to the court together with a
proposed judgment running in favor of Plaintiffs.

A telephone

conference call was held between the court and counsel wherein
the subject of the Stipulation was discussed, at which time the
court

refused to sign the proposed judgment.

Therefore, at the beginning of the trial, Willard R. Bishop
represented Lena, Elsie and Mark, even though he had originally
sued Elsie and Mark on behalf of Lena.

However, because of the

court's ruling, during a part of the first day of trial and
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during the entire second day of trial, Elsie was not represented
by counsel, (Finding of Fact No. 31, R. 647), and no one has
entered an appearance.on her behalf at this time.
It is evident that the trial court determined that the easy
way

to

resolve

this

dispute

Brinkerhoff became legally

was

to

incompetent

simply

rule

that

Elsie

in 1970 and allow all

past due payments to be paid, post-trial.

The court, however,

failed to recognize the legal significance of that ruling as it
relates to Elsie's interests (see discussion, below).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT ONE;
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT ARBITRARILY
FOUND THAT ELSIE BRINKERHOFF HAS BEEN LEGALLY INCOMPETENT
SINCE 1770.
The trial court determined the only way to find in favor of
Plaintiffs was to declare the seller, Elsie Brinkerhoff, legally
incompetent from and after 1970.

The effect of that ruling was

to void all documents she executed after 1970 including her last
will and testament, deeds, affidavits and a Trust Deed running
in her favor for $50,000.

However, all testimony presented was

clear and convincing that she was competent on each occasion
when she executed those documents in 1979, 1980 and 1982.
POINT TWO;
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FAILING TO
APPOINT A GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOLLOWING ITS DETERMINATION
THAT ELSIE BRINKERHOFF WAS INCOMPETENT.
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The

trial

court

found

that Defendant

Elsie

Brinkerhoff

became legally incompetent in 1970 and did so on the first day
of trial even though her competency was never at issue.
court

simultaneously

found

that

she was

not

being

The

properly

represented by her counsel, Willard R. Bishop, but failed to
recess trial and appoint a general guardian or guardian ad litem
to protect her interests.
all

evidence

presented

That ruling was clearly contrary to

and

the

court

thereafter

failed

to

protect the interests of Elsie Brinkerhoff.
POINT THREE:
THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT ELSIE BRINKERHOFF WAS
INCOMPETENT IN 1970 DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT SHE WAS
NOT SUFFICIENTLY COMPETENT TO EXECUTE BINDING DEEDS AND
CONTRACTS IN 1979 and 1980.
Even assuming arguendo that the trial court was correct in
ruling that Elsie Brinkerhoff was incompetent in 1970 and that
it could properly represent her best interests during the course
of the trial, there is ample evidence to indicate that Elsie
Brinkerhoff was competent when she executed documents in 1979,
1980 and 1982, as well as on other occasions.
POINT FOUR;
THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT THE 1966 CONTRACT TERMINATED
BY OPERATION OF LAW.
The evidence clearly indicates the intent to abandon the
contract by the parties because no payments were made for 1966,
1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, and 1971; the escrow required by the
contract was never fully established and all the deeds called
for in the contract'were never deposited.
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POINT FIVE:
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE PERFECT TENDER RULE
IN SPECIFICALLY ENFORCING THE 1966 CONTRACT.
By declaring Elsie incompetent, the court allowed the 1966
Purchase Agreement to be reinstated on the Plaintiffs1 payment
of $50,000, post-trial.

The Plaintiffs had in fact acknowledged

arrearages in payments of $30,000 at the time of trial.

Since

Plaintiffs as buyers, failed to tender that amount prior to or
at the time of trial, the trial court erred in granting a Decree
of Specific Performance in favor of Plaintiffs by reason of "The
Perfect Tender Rule".
POINT SIX:
MARK AND CLOYD OPERATED AS A PARTNERSHIP AND THE ACT OF ONE
PARTNER BINDS THAT PARTNERSHIP.
When Cloyd had the joint tenancy deed prepared in 1979 and
paid to have it recorded with partnership funds, he did so on
behalf of the partnership.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE
COURT
COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE
ERROR
ARBITRARILY FOUND THAT ELSIE BRINKERHOFF
LEGALLY INCOMPETENT SINCE 1970.
Without

any

supporting

evidence,

the

WHEN
IT
HAS BEEN

court

arbitrarily

ruled that Elsie Brinkerhoff has been legally incompetent since
1970.

(Finding of Fact 15, R. 640). There is not one shred of

evidence in the record to support a finding of incompetency even
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as early as 1979.

All witnesses who were asked about Elsie's

competency testified that she was competent in both 1979 and
1980 when she executed the joint tenancy deed and in 1980, when
she executed the deed conveying her one-half interest.
Such a ruling with all available evidence being contrary is
repugnant to the law and the presumptions created thereby.
In 28 Am.Jur., Insane and Other Incompetent Persons § 121,
(1962), p.751, it states:
"It is well settled that the law will presume sanity
rather
than
insanity,
competency
rather
than
incompetency; it will presume that every man is sane
and fully competent until satisfactory proof to the
contrary is presented."
*

*

*

This statement of the law was cited with approval by the Oregon
Supreme Court in First Christian Church in Salem v. McReynolds,
241 P.2d 135, 138 (Or. 1952) . The Oregon Court went on to add:
In accord with the general presumption of sanity,
there is a presumption that every man is capable of
managing his own affairs, and is responsible for his
own acts. Likewise, it is presumed that every man is
capable of understanding the nature and effect of his
contracts, and that he comprehends the effect and
result of legal proceedings. Accordingly, it may be
stated that as a general rule, all proceedings testing
the competency of a person, or involving the
competency of an individual to perform a certain act,
as to execute a valid conveyance of property or a
contract, start with the presumption of competency,
and that this presumption may be relied upon until the
contrary is shown."
*

*

*

First Christian Church in Salem v. McReynolds, 241 P.2d at 138.
See also Roybal v. Morris, 669 P.2d 1100 (N.M. 1983).
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The

foregoing

presumption

is

guarded

by

a

heightened

standard or burden of proof which requires the presentation of
"clear and convincing evidence" to rebutt it*
and

the

burden

of

proof

are

concisely

The presumption

stated

in Binder

v.

Binder, 309 P.2d 1050 (Wash. 1957):
"Mental competency is presumed; and in order to
establish
mental
incompetency,
fraud,
or
undue
influence, the evidence must be clear, cogent, and
convincing."
Binder v. Binder, 309 P.2d at 1053.
Recognizing

that

a

finding

of

incompetence

requires

a

balancing of the State's interest in protecting the person from
himself and the effect such a finding may have on a person's
individual liberties, the Utah Supreme Court embraced the "clear
and convincing" evidence test in In re Boyer, 636 P. 2d 1092
(Utah 1981).

In that case the court reasoned as follows:

"In the absence of a legislative directive on the
issue, we think those interests are best accommodated
by requiring evidence of incompetency by .clear and
convincing evidence."
*

*

*

In re Boyer, 636 P.2d at 1092.

See also Rawson v. Hardy, 48

P.2d 473 (Utah 1935) .
The

court

Plaintiffs

made

never

incompetent.
Complaint R.

a

finding

alleged

(See

that

Plaintiffs'

of

incompetence

Elsie

even

Brinkerhoff

Complaint,

R.

351-370; Pretrial Order prepared

was

1-8;

that

the

competency

of

Elsie

ever

Amended

by Plaintiffs'

counsel, R. 428-445; Trial Brief of Defendants, R.
Believing

though

had

472-523).

never

been
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challenged, in their Trial Brief, filed the first day of trial,
Defendants state as follows:
Of significance is the fact that Plaintiffs have not
plead fraud, undue influence, incompetency, or mistake
on the part of Elsie Brinkerhoff in connection with
the preparation of the 1979 joint tenancy deed or the
preparation of the 1980 transaction where Elsie deeded
to her five children.
Instead of making those claims, Plaintiffs have
elected to have Elsie sign a Stipulation whereby she
supposedly reaffirms the 1966 contract, disclaims the
1979 joint tenancy deed, disclaims the 1980 deeds from
herself
to her
five children, and waives
any
delinquent amounts owed to her by Mark or the estate
of Cloyd Brinkerhoff. (R. 488) .
The court simply searched for a way to find in favor of
Plaintiffs and did so by ignoring the presumption in favor of
competency, the fact that competency was not properly at issue,
and

the

fact

presumption

that

which

there

prevented

required burden of proof.

was
any

no

evidence

possibility

rebutting
of

meeting

the
the

Such a finding is clearly an abuse of

the trial court's discretion and fails in every way to protect
the interests of Elsie Brinkerhoff as the court tried to do in
its justification for so ruling.
A

summary

of

the

testimony

(See discussion infra).
and

even

the

statement

of

Elsie's counsel clearly indicates the error made by the trial
court

in ruling

that Elsie Brinkerhoff

has been

incompetent

since 1970.
STATEMENT OF WILLARD R. BISHOP, COUNSEL FOR ELSIE BRINKERHOFF.
In

Plaintiffs' opening

statement, Mr. Bishop

follows:
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stated

as

MR. BISHOP: The evidence will show, and I didn't
cover this but, the evidence will show that she (meaning
Elsie Brinkerhoff) is very alert, and maintains her own
home, and maintains her own checking account, pays her
bills, drives herself around and does all things that we
normally expect people to do in maintaining their daily
lives. (Tr. 26).
TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF MARK BRINKERHOFF.
Plaintiff Mark Brinkerhoff testified that in 1980 he
had a conversation with his mother, Elsie, concerning the
fact that she had refused to accept a check tendered by him
in the sum of $2,000. That at that time, he believed his
mother to be competent and that she was likewise competent
in 1979. (Tr. 79-81).
TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT GOLDA B. ADAIR.
Golda B. Adair is the daughter of Elsie Brinkerhoff.
She testified that in 1979, she saw her mother once or
twice a week and would call her about every day. That she
believed her to be competent in 1979 and 1980, that she was
able to handle her own affairs, that she wrote checks at
that time, that she paid her own bills, that she cleaned
her own home and that there was no change in her condition
from 1979 to 1980. (Tr. 477-478).
TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT ELSIE BRINKERHOFF.
At the time of trial Elsie Brinkerhoff was 86 years
old. She testified that she lives alone, that she reads at
home on a daily basis, that she gets around by herself,
that she still drives an automobile, has a drivers license,
does some of her own shopping, that she has a checking
account and manages it herself, that she has a savings
account, but that it is handled by her daughter Betty, that
she participates in senior citizens1 outings, that she does
her own sewing, washing, ironing, and cooking.
(Tr.
318-321) .
Elsie Brinkerhoff also testified that in her opinion,
she is now competent to handle her own affairs. (Tr. 326).
TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT CHARLES BRINKERHOFF.
Charles Brinkerhoff is the son of Elsie Brinkerhoff
and was an original Defendant when the action was filed.
He testified that his mother was competent in 1979 and
1980, and when asked if he thought she was competent at the

26

time of trial, answered flYesf to a certain extent, I do."
He also testified that he thought his mother was as
competent today as he was and that he can't remember any
more than she can, (Tr. 394-395) .
TESTIMONY OF DALE BRINKERHOFF.
Dale Brinkerhoff is the son of Plaintiff, Mark
Brinkerhoff, and the grandson of Elsie Brinkerhoff. Dale
Brinkerhoff's belief that his grandmother was competent is
evidenced by both his testimony and the fact that he had
his grandmother sign a document he prepared on August 13th,
1983 (Exhibit 11) and the Stipulation whereby Elsie
reaffirmed the 1966 contract (Exhibit 40, attached).
Mr. Brinkerhoff testified that he visited regularly
with his grandmother, and that she was competent in 1979,
1980, and that she was competent at the time of trial.
(Tr. 420).
TESTIMONY OF BRAD ADAIR.
Brad Adair is the son of Golda Adair and the grandson
of Elsie Brinkerhoff.
He is employed by Southern Utah
Title Company in Kanab, Utah. He testified that after he
prepared the joint tenancy deed (as well as a deed from
Elsie
to
Charles
for
property
unrelated
to
this
transaction), he delivered them to Charles who obtained the
signature
of Elsie
and
returned
them
to him
for
recordation, that he had a conversation with Elsie wherein
she indicated that she signed the deeds, that the deeds
were delivered back to him by Charles for recordation and
the deeds were both recorded, one right after the other.
(Tr. 438-443).
He also testified that the cost for
recording the joint tenancy deed was the sum of $18.00 and
that it was paid by his employer, Southern Utah Title.
(Tr. 444) .
Southern Utah Title was reimbursed the
recording costs for the joint tenancy deed by a check from
the partnership on December 31, 1979.
(See Exhibit 19,
Entry Book, Kane County Recorder showing recordation costs
for joint tenancy deed in the sum of $18.50 and compared to
the last page of Exhibit 39, check records for Mark J. and
Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff Partnership, indicating that a check
was made payable to Brad Adair on December 31st, 1979 for
the sum of $18.00) .
As to the competency of Elsie Brinkerhoff, Brad Adair
testified that he thought his grandmother, Elsie, was
competent in 1979 and 1980, that he explained to her the
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fact that she would be deeding her one-half interest when
she executed the deed to her five children and that she
would receive back a Trust Deed for $50,000.
(Tr.
447-448).
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM WEBSTER ADAIR,
Webster Adair is the husband of Golda Adair, and the
Kane County Recorder. He testified that Elsie came to his
home about every Sunday for dinner until this litigation
started and Dale Brinkerhoff had told her not to have
anything to do with his family any more, that he had a
conversation with Elsie two or three weeks after Cloyd's
death and when he inquired as to whether or not she wanted
Mark to have all of the property, she said no. He also
testified that he was present when the Trust Deed, Trust
Deed Notes and Warranty Deed from Elsie to her five
children were discussed and explained to her, that she
raised no objection to the same, and that she was competent
in June of 1979 and in 1980. (Tr. 466-472).
TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF LENA A. BRINKERHOFF.
Lena Brinkerhoff is the widow of Cloyd Brinkerhoff,
the sister of Webster Adair, and a Plaintiff herein. She
testified that during the summer of 1979, she saw Elsie
Brinkerhoff a couple of times a week, that in June of 1979,
she thought Elsie Brinkerhoff to be competent, that she
thought that when her husband took anything to Elsie for
signature, that he explained to her the things she would
need to know when she had to sign something, including a
deed.
That she also thought Elsie Brinkerhoff to be
competent in 1980, that if documents were taken to her,
they were explained to her and that in her opinion, her
husband, Cloyd, believed that Elsie understood what she was
signing. (Tr. 480-483) .
A

careful

review

of

the

transcript

indicates

that

Plaintiff's counsel never once asked any witness whether or not
he

or

she

incompetent.

believed

Elsie

Brinkerhoff

The reason is obvious:

to

be

competent

or

How can you allege and

prove the incompetency of your own client

(Elsie) when a few

months prior to that time, you prepared a Stipulation for her to
sign

(without

counsel)

that
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did

away

with

the

claims

of the Defendants, waived any past due payments owed to by her
Co-Plaintiffs, and requested

the court to enter a Decree of

Specific Performance against her.

(Exhibit 40, attached).

As indicated above, on the first day of trial, the court
determined

that the

interests

of Elsie Brinkerhoff

were

not

being fully protected, and that even though she needed separate
counsel to represent her interests, the court would not hold up
the trial for the purpose of bringing in independent counsel,
but instead would look out for her interests.

(Tr. 347, Finding

of Fact No. 31, R. 647). However, the court actually failed to
look out for the interests of Elsie Brinkerhoff, where, with all
evidence

to

the

contrary,

incompetent since 1970.

it

found

Elsie

to

have

been

Using that same reasoning, the court

could have just as easily determined that Elsie was incompetent
in

1966 when

the purchase

thereby voiding

the entire

contract

(Exhibit

transaction.

The

1) was

signed,

effect of

that

would have been to return all of the property to Elsie, said
property having a value at the date of trial of approximately
$410,000.

(Exhibit 37). The evidence, or lack thereof, as to

Elsie's incompetencey is just as strong for 1966 as it was in
1970.

If

the

court

was

trying

to

find

some

evidence

of

incompetency to support its finding, the fact that no payments
were made to Elsie by her sons for 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970
and 1971, could just as easily have evidenced her incompetency
for the reason that she apparently made no claim against them by
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reason of nonpayment.

Using what appears to be the trial

courtfs logic, the failure to request payment on the part of
Elsie would manifest her incompetence as early as 1966, if any
finding at all of her incompetency is justified.
Further indication of the trial court's failure to protect
Elsie Brinkerhoff is the fact that the court declared the Last
Will and Testament of Elsie Brinkerhoff dated April 23, 1982,
(Exhibit 13, attached) to be null and void, even though said
will was prepared by the law offices of Olsen and Chamberlain,
Richfield, Utah, attested to by two independent witnesses who
each verified that in their opinions, Elsie Brinkerhoff was of
sound and disposing mind and memory and not acting under any
menace, fraud or undue influence.

Furthermore, that will is

notarized as required by Utah law, and pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated 75-2-504, constitutes a self-proved will.
The issue of competency was not plead and was not before
the

court

prior

to

the

time

of

trial.

However, because

Defendants needed to rebut the finding by the court on the first
day

of

trial,

the

foregoing

testimony

substantiating

the

competency of Elsie Brinkerhoff was taken and remains unrebutted
in the record.

There is no "clear and convincing evidence" of

any peculiar act or event occurring in 1970, or otherwise, upon
which the trial court could have based its finding that Elsie
became incompetent at that time.
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In Cornia v. Corniaf 546 P.2d 890 (Utah 1976), the court
dealt with a factual situation somewhat "reciprocal" to the
foregoing

and

held

that

the

trial

court

had

abused

its

discretion in going beyond the issues before it.
In Cornia, the court was involved in a proceeding to have a
guardian appointed

for an 81-year-old woman.

The issue of

competency was paramount and properly before the court.

The

trial court ruled that the woman was sufficiently incompetent to
warrant the appointment of a guardian.
indications

that during

a period

There were additional

prior

to the

adjudicated

incompetency, the woman had executed a will and a trust deed
conveying away a certain portion of her property.

The trial

court therefore included in its ruling an order declaring the
will and the trust deed to be null and void.

The Supreme Court

affirmed the competency ruling but held that "the trial court
erred in declaring null and void the will and trust deed [that
the woman] had executed.

Cornia, 546 P.2d at 893. The Supreme

Court observed that the only issue before the trial court was
the issue of competency at the time of trial and not two years
prior thereto. The Supreme Court went on to state:
While it is true that our rules provide for liberality
in procedure and the granting of relief to which the
evidence shows a party entitled, this does not go so
far as to authorize the granting of relief on issues
neither raised nor tried.
Cornia v. Cornia, 546 P.2d at 893.
In the present case, the trial court was presented with the
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parties1 dispute over enforcement of a 1966 Real Estate Contract
or a subsequently joint tenancy deed recorded on the same real
property,

with

collateral

issues

of

rescission, forfeiture, payment, etc.

waiver,

abandonment,

Where neither Plaintiff

nor Defendant had raised the issue of incompetency, the grantor
was

entitled

to

the

benefit

of

her

presumed

competency.

However, without an actionable issue before it, without allowing
for the grantor to be represented by competent counsel, and in
the face of unrebutted evidence to the contrary, the trial court
attempted

to

resolve

the

law

suit by

declaring

the

grantor

incompetent from some prior and arbitrary point in time, and
relying on that declaration, nullifying and voiding all of the
incompetent's subsequent contracts and conveyances.
The Cornia court used a proper determination of competency
to

void

a prior

executed

deed

and

was

reversed

as

to

the

avoidance; the trial court in the present case used an improper
determination of incompetency to "boot-strap" its way
later

avoidance

severance

of the

of both
tenancy

a

joint

and

tenancy

an even

one-half interest in the same property.

deed,

a

into a

subsequent

later conveyance

of a

Such "boot-strapping"

at the expense of an individual's competency when neither the
pleadings nor the evidence so indicates is an unquestionable
abuse of discretion and, at a minimum, constitutes reversible
error.
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POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY .FAILING
TO APPOINT A GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOLLOWING ITS
DETERMINATION THAT ELSIE BRINKERHOFF WAS INCOMPETENT.
Rule 17(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in
pertinent part:
When an infant or an insane or incompetent person is a
party, he must appear either by his general guardian,
or by a guardian ad litem appointed in the particular
case by the court in which the action is pending.
(Emphasis added.)
*

*

*

Nowhere in the rule is there a provision for the trial
court to "look after someone's interest", particularly during a
trial.

The rule specifically states that an incompetent person

can only appear by his guardian and that absent a general
guardian, the court must appoint for the incompetent person a
guardian ad litem.

By acting as it did, the trial court has

obviously exceeded its statutory authority.
By analogy, in Matter of Estate of Anderson, 671 P. 2d 165
(Utah 1983) , the Utah Supreme Court held that the trial court
had exceeded its statutory power and the rational for reversal
is somewhat applicable to the situation present in this case.
The court stated:
In the case under review the [court's] order attempted
to void testamentary dispositions made by a protected
person who had not been declared incompetent. The
applicable statutes did not give the court the power
to make that order.
*

*

*

Matter of Estate of Anderson, 671 P.2d at 169.
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In the instant case the court also failed to address in its
decision or its Findings of Fact, Elsie's Counterclaim that the
1966

contract

had

been

rescinded,

abandoned,

terminated

by

operation of law or terminated by reason of nonpayment, thus
restoring

the

entire

property

to

her.

Likewise,

the

court

failed to address any of the other claims of Elsie set forth in
the pretrial order.
had been

incompetent

(R. 428-444).

Instead the court found she

for 15 years, contrary to all evidence

presented.
In the case at bar, the trial court exceeded its statutory
power by failing and refusing to appoint a guardian ad litem.
It is inconceivable

that in the same breath the court could

declare a person incompetent and assert that it would thereafter
be

"looking

out

for

the

incompetent's

best

interests."

In

presuming to represent the interest of the incompetent person
the court predjudiced itself, contravened the express provisions
of the rule, worked an injustice to the alleged incompetent, and
committed reversible error.

POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT ELSIE BRINKERHOFF
WAS INCOMPETENT IN 1970 DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT
SHE WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY COMPETENT TO EXECUTE BINDING
DEEDS AND CONTRACTS IN 1979 AND 1980.
Even assuming arguendo that the trial court was correct in
ruling that Elsie Brinkerhoff was incompetent in 1970 and that
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it could properly represent her best interests during the course
of trial, the trial court's ruling of incompetency in 1970 does
not necessarily preclude the possibility of Elsie experiencing
periods of lucidity in which she possessed the requisite mental
capacity to enter into a binding contract or execute a valid
deed.

While it is recognized that such a ruling of incompetency

carries

with

it

some

presumption

of

constancy,

it must

be

remembered that the ruling was made in 1985, several years after
the most recent conveyances.

Therefore, the subject conveyances

having occurred prior to the adjudication of incompetency are
entitled to a presumption that the grantor was competent and
that the conveyances are valid.
In Tate v. Murphy, 217 P.2d 177 (Okla. 1949), the Oklahoma
Supreme Court wrestled with a factual situation as complicated
and convoluted as that in the present case.

The court in Tate

dealt with an aging widow who sought to provide for a foster
child
years.

who had

provided

care

and

companionship

in her

final

The testimony on the elderly woman's mental capacity was

plentiful; however, contrary to the present case, there were a
few witnesses who expressed concern over her apparent lack of
capacity.

Such concern was generally couched in terms derived

from her aged and feeble condition.

In addressing the issues,

testimony, and evidence before it, the court in Tate stated:
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[T]o render a contract voidable on account of the
mental incapacity of one of the parties to it f it is
not enough that such party was at times, from whatever
cause, lacking in sufficient sanity to understand what
he was doing, but the evidence of his defective
intelligence must relate to the immediate time of
making the contract.
A deed, mortgage, or other
conveyance or contract made by an insane person, but
during a lucid interval before his incapacity has been
judicially
determined, is valid
and enforceable,
(Emphasis added•)
*

*

*

Tate v.Murphy, 217 P.2d at 185, citing Mullen v. First Guaranty
State Bank of Crossplains, Texas, 113 Okl. 84, 239 P. 161, 162
(1925) .
The court in Uribe v. Olson, 42 Or.App. 647, 601 P.2d 818
(1979) , held similarly:
Even where there are substantial indications of mental
incompetence, it is possible that a person may have
"lucid
intervals" during which he possesses the
requisite capacity. Capacity includes the ability to
reason and exercise judgment and, in essence, to
bargain with the other party.
Neither old age,
illness, or extreme emotional distress is sufficient of
itself to negate such capacity.
(Parenthesis in
original; Citations omitted.)
Uribe v. Olson, 601 P.2d at 820; See also Hatch v. Hatch, 148 P.
433 (Utah 1914) .
In

the

case

at

bar,

Brad

Adair

testified

that

Elsie

Brinkerhoff gave serious consideration to the deeds which she
executed in both 1979 and 1980.

Furthermore, he gave specific

testimony that Elsie was competent at the time the deeds were
executed and notarized.

Likewise, every witness who was asked

concerning Elsie's competency testified that she was competent
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in both 1979 and 1980.

With no testimony to the contrary, and

with the benefit of the presumption in favor of competency as
set forth in Point One, above, there is absolutely no reason why
the joint tenancy deed of 1979 and the conveyance of Elsie's
one-half

interest

by

Trust

Deed

in

1980, should

have

been

declared null and void by the trial court.
None of the Defendants had anything to do with the actual
preparation, execution and recordation of the joint tenancy deed
prepared in June of 1979.
recorded

at

the

request

That deed was prepared, executed and
of Cloyd

Brinkerhoff.

The

cost

record the joint tenancy deed was paid by the partnership.

to
The

record provides no evidence of undue influence on the part of
Plaintiffs or Defendants when that deed was executed by Elsie,
and the only testimony before the trial court was that Elsie
Brinkerhoff was competent in 1979 and 1980.
Utah law is very clear that absent fraud, duress, mistake
or the like attributable to the grantee
Elsie)

a competent

grantor will not be permitted

impeach his own deed.
Inc. , 356 P. 2d 286

(i.e., Mark, Cloyd or
to act or

Desert Centers, Inc. v. Glen Canyon,

(Utah 1960) .

Furthermore, a grantor of a

deed is presumed to be legally competent to make a conveyance
and, there is no presumption of incompetency where the grantor's
mind is weakened by "trouble and old age", or where the grantor
was once proved

insane.

First Christian Church

McReynolds, supra; Grover v. Garn, 464 P.2d
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598

in Salem v.
(Utah 1970),

Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 218, 178 P. 433 (1914).
v. Johnson, 411 P.2d

498

See also Watson

(Okla. 1967), which

indicate

that

contracts and deeds are not invalid merely because one party may
be infeebled by old age and/or disease in such a way that some
of his mental processes are affected if at the time the deed is
executed

and delivered

the party understands

the nature

and

effect of the execution of the instruments.

POINT FOUR
THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT THE
CONTRACT TERMINATED BY OPERATION OF LAW

1966

The evidence strongly suggests that Elsie as the seller and
Mark and Cloyd as the buyers simply abandoned their interests in
the 1966 contract.

In Forsyth v. Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358 (Utah

1980), the court adopted the language from Timpanogos Highlands,
Inc. v. Harper, 544 P.2d 481, 484 (Utah 1975), which stated:
The term "abandonment" in the sense involved here means
the intentional relinquishment of one's rights in the
contract; and in order to nullify such rights, there
must be a clear and unequivocal showing of such
abandonment. Where there is dispute as to whether this
had occurred, it is usually a question of fact, to be
determined from the circumstances of the particular
case, which includes not only nonperformance, but also
expressions of intent and other actions.
Regarding the specific intention to abandon, the following
is stated in 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Abandoned, Lost, etc., Property,
§40 (1962), p. 32:
Intention to abandon property may be shown by the
declarations or conduct of the party who, it is
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claimed, abandoned the right. But it is not necessary
to prove intention to abandon by express declarations
or by other direct evidence; intent to abandon property
or rights of property is to be determined, . . . from
all the surrounding facts and circumstances . . . by
which that fact may be established.
*

Consistent

with

the

*

*

foregoing,

the

court

in

Forsyth

recognized that while the intent to abandon must be clear and
unequivocal, that intention need not be shown by the positive
testimony of the purchaser but may be inferred from his acts and
conduct, i.e., non payment.

Forsyth, 617 P. 2d at 361.

The

court in Forsyth further pointed out that a such an intent to
abandon by both parties to an agreement may be found to work a
rescission of the contract. 617 P.2d at 361.
Such a mutual rescission was found by the court in Wallace
v. Build, 16 Utah 2d 401, 402 P.2d 699 (1965).
observed

that

the

facts

presented

a

There the court

"situation

where

the

defendant had shown by unequivocal acts that he regarded the
agreement as abandoned, and that the plaintiff had acquiesced in
this . . . ."

402 P.2d at 701.

The facts in the present case evince an aging seller,
mother of the buyers, who for apparent want of family harmony
and

sound

legal

advice

regarding

her

contract

rights

and

responsibilities, failed to give effective demand for payment
and notice of default; and sellers who possessed and used the
subject property to their apparent financial benefit, but who
routinely failed to make their agreed payments and for whatever
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reason continued to take advantage of the familial situation and
their mother's apparent reluctance to act against them.

Indeed,

the parties began the contractual relationship on a note of
abandonment by agreeing to execute deeds and set up an escrow,
neither of which was ever fully accomplished.

Perhaps most

illustrative of the mutual abandonment or rescission of the 1966
contract is the joint tenancy deed of 1979 wherein Elsie, as
sole grantor conveyed

fee title to the subject property to

herself, Mark and Cloyd, as joint tenants.

It is particularly

notable that this conveyance was done at the instance and with
the acquiesence of Mark and Cloyd.
Technically, this was something of a two-step transaction.
Presumably, Elsie had only "legal" title to the subject property
as

a

result

of

the

1966

contract;

also, Mark

and

Cloyd

presumably had acquired some quantum of "equitable" title by
virtue of the same transaction.

Therefore, Elsie could not have

conveyed fee title via the 1979 joint tenancy deed without Mark
and Cloyd having first waived and surrendered their "equitable"
title back to her.

There was obviously no documentation to

support such a "fictional reconveyance;" however, as stated, the
very

creation

of

the

joint

tenancy

deed

requires

such

a

hypothetical result; and the acquiesence of Mark and Cloyd in
its documentation and recording seems to be conclusive with
respect to the parties1 mutual understanding and intent.
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Not to be overlooked in this transaction is Elsie's obvious
reliance on the contractual provisions which required payment in
full prior to actual conveyance to the buyers.

There is little

doubt but what Elsie believed that the buyers' failure to pay
meant

that

she retained

complete

ownership

of the property.

Equally as persuasive is the apparent mutual assumption of Mark
and Cloyd that with the joint tenancy in place, their mother
would

predecease

them

and

they

would

then

end

up with

the

property "free and clear," having paid next to nothing for it.
The historical lack of enforcement and lack of performance
in this case, together with the uncontested "reconveyance" and
subsequent

joint

tenancy

deed,

creates

an

overwhelming

presumption of mutual abandonment or mutual rescision of the
1966

contract.

However,

because

the

court

elected

to

arbitrarily find Elsie to be incompetent since 1970, the court
failed to even address those issues on behalf of the incompetent
that the court undertook

to represent.

created a "Catch 22" situation.

The trial court has

If Elsie was incompetent in

1970, she had no capacity to declare a forfeiture or demand
payment since that time.
From 1970 to 1982 when this litigation was filed, Mark and
Cloyd had only paid their mother $6,996.75 and to allow them to
come in 16 years later and reinstate the contract is a gross
miscarriage of justice.

Assuming Elsie's incompetency in 1970,

the trial court should have at least addressed the issues of
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forfeiture, nonpayment, rescission and abandonment on behalf of
Elsie

prior

to

that

time.

That

evidence

clearly

indicates

intent to abandon by the buyers because no payments were made
for 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970 and 1971; the escrow was never
established

and deeds called

for in the contract were never

deposited.
If the trial court was really trying to protect Elsie in
her aging years, the court could have

ruled

tenancy

of

deed

constituted

a reformation

the

the

1979

1966

joint

contract

based on mutual agreement and ordered Mark, after Cloyd's death,
to pay his mother one-half of the purchase price
bargained for in 1966.

originally

Using that reasoning, the 1980 deed from

Elsie to her children and the Trust Deed back

to Elsie

for

$50,000 would likewise become valid.

Hence, Elsie would have

benefited by several thousand dollars.

Furthermore, if Lena had

any claim at all, it was against Mark as the surviving partner
and they have now agreed to share equally in whatever property
Mark receives.

(Tr. 125).

POINT FIVE
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE
PERFECT
TENDER
RULE
IN
SPECIFICALLY
ENFORCING THE 1966 CONTRACT
Prior

to

filing

the

lawsuit, Plaintiffs, by

their

own

admission, were in default of the terms of the 1966 contract and
delinquent

approximately

$30,000
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in

payments.

In

filing,

Plaintiffs sought specific performance of the contract.

This

continuing, uncured default should have precluded the trial
court from ordering that the contract be specifically enforced,
which was essentially the precise effect of the courts decision.
(Judgment and Decree Quieting Title, paragraph 2, R. 655).
The Utah Supreme articulated and relied on the "Perfect
Tender

Rule"

in

Century

21

All

Western

Real

Estate

Investment, Inc. v. Webb, 645 P.2d 52 (Utah 1982) .
dismissed

and

The court

the purchaser's suit for specific performance for

their failure to tender their own performance before or at the
time of bringing suit.

In so holding, the court stated:

[N]either party can be said to be in default (and
thus susceptible to a judgment for damages or a
decree of specific performance) until the other
party has tendered his own performance. In other'
words, the party who desires to use legal process
to exercise his legal remedies under such a
contract must make a tender of his own agreed
performance in order to put the other party in
default.
To qualify under this rule, a tender, such as an
offer to pay money, must be complete and
unconditional• (Citations omitted.)
*

*

*

Century 21 All Western Real Estate and Investment, Inc. v.
Webb, 645 P.2d at 56.
In Fischer v. Johnson, 525 P.2d
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(Utah 1974), the

Supreme Court reversed the trial court's Decree of Specific
Performance because the purchasers failed to tender the sum of
$3,000.

The court stated:
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But it is also true that specific performance is a
remedy of equities; and one who invokes it must have
clean hands in having done equity himself. That is,
he must take care to discharge his own duties under
the contract; and he cannot rely on any mere
inconvenience as an excuse for so doing. Even if
inconvenience or difficulty is encountered, he must
make an effort to perform, or to tender performance,
which manifests unreasonable diligence and bona fide
desire to keep his own promises.
Fischer v. Johnson, 525 P.2d at 46.

See also Lincoln Land and

Development Company v. Thompson, 489 P. 2d 426

(Utah 1971),

which also reversed the trial court that had entered a Decree
of Specific Performance wherein the balance of the down payment
in the sum of $5,800 was not tendered.

The court stated:

Before the plaintiff was entitled to a decree of
performance it had the burden of showing that it had
exercised the option in accordance with its terms.
The plaintiff had the burden of establishing that it
had paid or tendered the amount specified in the
option within the prescribed time. It is clear from
the record that the plaintiff failed to tender the
sum agreed upon within the time specified in the
option. It would thus appear that the trial court
erroneously
granted
the
Decree
of
Specific
Performance.
Lincoln Land and Development Company v. Thompson, 489 P. 2d at

The trial courtfs
tender

and

its

acceptance

subsequent

ruling

of Plaintiffs' imperfect
providing

that

the

1966

contract be specifically performed is in direct conflict with
the Utah Supreme Court's clear and concise statement of the
law.

Such misapplication of the law should be appropriately

rectified by this Court on review.
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POINT SIX
MARK AND CLOYD OPERATED AS A PARTNERSHIP
AND THE ACT OF ONE PARTNER BINDS THAT
PARTNERSHIP.
There

is

no

dispute

that

since

1966, Mark

and

Cloyd

operated as a partnership*
When Cloyd had the joint tenancy deed prepared in 1979 and
paid to have it recorded with partnership funds , he did so on
behalf of the partnership.

Those acts binds not only himself,

but his partner, Mark Brinkerhoff, as well.

See Utah Code

Annotated §§ 48-1-6 and 48-1-9 (1953), attached.

CONCLUSION
The trial court's arbitrary ruling that Elsie Brinkerhoff
has been legally incompetent since 1970, has no basis either in
the evidence presented or in the applicable law.

The trial

court ignored the time honored presumption that a person is
presumed

competent

until

produced to the contrary.

clear

and

convincing

evidence

is

Such a ruling without any legal or

factual basis whatsoever required the court to reach far beyond
its

discretionary

bounds

and

such

an

abuse

of

discretion

constitutes reversible error.
Likewise, the trial courts contravention of the statutory
requirement
guardian

ad

that an
litem

incompetent

person be represented

is also highly

inappropriate.

by a

Even more

inappropriate is the court's effort to remain independent and
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objective while taking upon itself the additional burden of
"looking out for the alleged incompetent's
the trial.
outside

Such acts, even though well intentioned, fall well

the

judicial

interests" during

bounds

of

calling.

the

Such

court's
acts

statutory

are

far

authority
from

and

harmless,

particularly to the alleged incompetent, and such a misuse of
judicial authority is so erroneous as to demand reversal.
Simply
enfeebled

because
by

conveyances
attention

age,
had

was

the

grantor

and

practically

been
drawn

executed
to

the

was

arguably
because

long

weakened

and

contracts

and

before

grantor's

any

mental

judicial

state,

the

grantor's business dealings, as a matter of law are presumed
valid.

This

being

the

case,

the

deeds,

affidavits,

and

agreements entered into by Elsie Brinkerhoff prior to the time
of trial, are all valid, effective and binding on her and those
with whom she dealt in the absence of fraud, coercion, duress,
or undue influence.
deeds, conveyances

All such influences being absent, such
and contracts, and

specifically

those

in

1979 and 1980 are entitled to a positive presumption, and in
fact should and do continue in full legal force and effect.
Even

assuming

that

the

1966

lingering validity, the Plaintiff's
life back

into

it suffered

a

fatal

contract

may

have

tardy effort to breathe
shortfall.

imperfect tender should have precluded

Plaintiff's

the trial court from

considering specific enforcement as a viable remedy.
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some

However,

consistent with the trial court's misguided handling of the
other- aspects of this suit, specific performance was in fact
ordered in direct contradiction of the facts and the applicable
law.

Again, even with the appropriate presumptions in favor of

the trial court's ruling, there is ample room for this Court to
intercede on behalf of the facts and the law, which to this
point have been misaligned.
This court should reverse the trial court in all respects
and

declare

conveyances
enforceable.
Deed

Notes

Brinkerhoff.

the

1979

from

Elsie

joint
to

tenancy

her

five

Likewise, this court
and

Trust

Deed

deed

and

children

should

running

in

the

binding

1980
and

enforce the Trust
favor

of

Elsie

Such a holding would leave Mark and Lena still

owning seven-tenths of the subject property which is far more
than they are entitled

to receive.

However, if this court

sustains the finding that Elsie was incompetent at an early
date, that date should be 1964 or 1965 and the 1966 contract of
sale consequently declared null and void.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

3 '

day of October, 138.6.

H^Cns Q. Chamberlain
HAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE
Attorneys for
efendants/Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that on this

day of October,

1986, ten (10) copies of the within and foregoing APPELLANTS1
BRIEF were delivered to the Clerk of the Supreme Court, four
(4) copies of the within and foregoing BRIEF were delivered to
Willard R. Bishop, BISHOP & RONNOW, P.C., 36- North 300 West,
Cedar City, Utah, 84720 and one copy to F. Kirk Heaton,
Attorney at Law, General Guardian for Elsie Brinkerhoff, 70
North Main, Kanab, Utah 84741.
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ADDENDUM
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WILLARD R. BISHOP
BISHOP & RONNOK, P. C.
A t t o r n e v for P l a i n t i f f s
P. 0. Box 279
C e d a r C i t y , OT 84720
Telephone:
(801) 536-9483
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COORT OP IAHE COUNTY
STATE OP UTAH
MONT R. ANDERSON, p e r s o n a l
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e E s t a t e
Of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF,
LENA BRINKERHOFF, and MARK J .
BRINKERHOFF,

vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B.
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF,
ARLENE B. GOULDING, and JOHN
DOES I through V,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs,

Defendants.

PIRST AMENDED FINDIRGS OP
PACT AND CONCLUSIONS OP LAW

Civil No. 1826

)

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial to the
Court, sitting without a jury, on Thursday and Friday, February
21

and

22, 1985.

representative

of

Plaintiffs
the

Estate

MONT
of

R.

CLOYD

ANDERSON,
H.

as

personal

BRINKERBOFF,

LENA

BRINKERHOFF, and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF appeared personally and were
represented by their counsel of record, Mr. Willard B. Bishop.
Defendant

ELSIE

represented
Defendants

BRINKERBOFF

by her attorney of
GOLDA

B. ADAIR,

appeared
record,

WARREN

personally
Mr. Willard

BRINKERBOFF,

and

was

R. Bishop.

and ARLENE B.

GOOLDING also appeared personally, and were represented by their
attorney

of

record,

Mr.

Hans

Q.

Chamberlain.

BRINKERBOFF and BETTY B. ESPLIN were present.

CHARLES

A.

The Court noted

that originally, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF and BETTY B. ESPLIN had
been named as Defendants, but had been dismissed from the lawsuit
by reason of having settled their differences with Plaintiffs.
Witnesses were sworn and evidence was presented.
had.

Argument was

Based upon the evidence, good cause appearing, the Court

now makes and enters its:
FIHDIK3S OP PACT
1.

Prior to to August cf 1960, MERLE ERINKERBOPF and ELSIE

J. BRINKERHOFF were husband and wife, residing in Kane Count*,
Utah.

MERLE

accumulated

DEISKEREQFF

various

v:as

farming

and

e

farmer

ranching

and

rancher,

properties

and

in Kane

County, Otah, and in Northern Arizen?..
2.

MERLE and ELSIE BRINKERHOFF were the parents of HARK J.

BRINKERHOFF,

CLOYD

H.

BRINKERHOFF,

now

deceased?

WARREN

BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. GOOLDING, CHARLES BRINKERHOFF, BETTY B.
ESPLIN, and GOLDA B. ADAIR.

Plaintiff LENA BRINKERHOFF is the

surviving widow of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF.
3.

In or about August of 1960, MERLE BRINKERHOFF died.

As a

result of the normal probate process, the farming and ranching
property owned by MERLE BRINKERHOFF passed to Defendant ELSIE J.
BRINKERHOFF.
4.

On or about October 26, 1966, or December 10, 1967, ELSIE

BRINKERHOFF executed a certain agreement covering the sale of
certain of the farm and ranch real and personal property to MARK
J. BRINKERHOFF and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF.

The contract was the

result of arm's length bargaining, and was entered into by ELSIE
BRINKERHOFF with the advice of counsel.
-2-

At the time of entering

into

the

agreement,

ELSIE

BRINKERHOFF

was

fully

competent,

legally and in every other sense.
5.

Prior

execution

to,

concurrent

of the agreement

with,

between

and

subsequent

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF,

to

the

MARK

J.

BRINKERHOFF and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, all the family members were
and still are aware of the existence of the contract.
6.

Dpon execution of the contract, the purchasers, MARK J.

BRINKERHOFF and CLOYD E. BRINKERHOFF went

into and remained in

possession of the real property covered by the agreement.
the

date

of

trial,

MARK

J.

BRINKERHOFF,

and

the

As of

personal

representative and heirs of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, still remained
in possession of the real property, including grazing and water
rights.

If any other children of ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF desired to

use or graze livestock upon the property, they were permitted to
do so without objection.
7.

Basically,

conveyance

of

the

the

agreement

personal

and

provided
real

BRINKERBOFF and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF,

that

in return for

property

to

MARK

J.

the buyers would pay the

minimum sum of $53,388, payable at the rate of $2,000 per year,
without

interest, during the lifetime of ELSIE BRINKERBOFF.

In

the event that the total minimum price of $53,388 was not paid by
the

time

of

ambiguous

the death

with

respect

of

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF,

to

the

disposition

the contract

and

payment

was

of the

unpaid, amount of the minimum. The contract provided that it and
documents

of

Hurricane

Branch of the Bank of St. George, so that upon full

performance

conveyance

by

the

were

purchasers,
-3-

to

be

MARK

placed

J.

in

escrow

BRINKERHOFF

in the

and

LEAH

BRINKERHOFF, his wife, would receive legal title to an undivided
one-half
CLOYD

(*?)

H.

interest

BRINKERHOFF

in
and

the

property,

LENA

as joint

BRINKERHOFF,

his

tenants; and
wife,

would

receive an undivided one-half (**) interest in the properties, as
joint tenants.

Payments were to be made to the Hurricane Branch

of the Bank of St. George.
8.

The only documents which were ever actually

deposited

with the escrow agent, consisted of a Warranty Deed from ELSIE
BRINKERHOFF to MARK and LEAH BRINKERHOFF, and a Quit Claim Deed

from ELSIE BRINKERHOFF to MARK and LEAH BRINKERHOFF.
documents

were

ever

deposited

into

the

bank

No other

escrow,

and

no

payments were made to the escrow holder.
9.

Payments were made by the purchasers to ELSIE BRINKERHOFF

outside the escrow, as follows:
A.

$ 2 , 0 0 0 . '00 p a i d on or b e f o r e November 1 , 1 9 6 4 .

B.

$2,000.1 00 p a i d on or b e f o r e November 1 , 1 9 6 5 .

C.

$ 4 3 0 . 7 5 p a i d June 1 7 , 1 9 7 2 .

D.

$780.00 p a i d November 1 7 , 1 9 7 2 .

E.

$ 5 0 0 . 0 0 p a i d Karch 1 9 , 1 9 7 3 .

F.

$ 5 0 0 . 0 0 p a i d October 2 6 , 1 9 7 3 .

G.

$780.00 p a i d November 2 8 , 1 9 7 3 .

H.

$ 5 0 0 . 0 0 p a i d Kay 1 3 , 1 9 7 4 .

I.

$600.00 p a i d January 2 0 , 1 9 7 5 .

J.

$ 5 0 0 . 0 0 p a i d December 1 5 ,

K.

$400.00 p a i d i n December of

L.

$706.00 p a i d November 1 3 , 1 9 7 9 .

M.

$ 1 , 3 0 0 . 0 0 p a i d on November 1 3 , 1 9 7 9 .

1975.
1976.

N.

52,000.00 paid November 6, 1983.

0.

$2,000.00 paid November 4, 1984.

As of the date of trial, contract payments totalled $14,996.75.
10.
MARK

On various occasions and at various times,

J.

BRINKERBOFF

and

CLOYD

B.

BRINKERBOFF,

now

Plaintiff
deceased,

claimed to have made additional payments to ELSIE BRINKERBOFF in
the nature of support and assistance, as required and requested
by

ELSIE

BRINKERBOFF.

The

Court

finds

that

such

additional

payments and contributions were not intended to be payments under
the

contract

BRINKERBOFF

by

which

were

MARK

J.

purchasers,

but

BRINKERBOFF
were

and

supplied

CLOYD
to

H.

ELSIE

BRINKERBOFF in the nature of gifts and support which sons would
normally provide to their widowed mother.
11.

At no time from and after the inception of the agreement

between ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF, MARK J. BRINKERBOFF, and CLOYD B.
BRINKERBOFF
declare

and the time of trial, did ELSIE BRINKERBOFF ever

herself

dissatisfied

with

the

performance

of

the

purchasers under the contract, nor did she declare the contract
in default or attempt to terminate the contract.

That contract

is still in existence, in full force and effect.
12.

Although

delinquent

the agreement

amounts, the Court

provided

for

no

interest

on

finds that ELSIE BRINKERBOFF was

and is entitled to receive interest at 6% per annum on delinquent
amounts

accruing

prior

to

May

14, 1981,

and

is

entitled

to

receive interest at 10% per annum on delinquent amounts accruing
after May 14, 1981.
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13.

The Court finds the following to be a true and correct

accounting of amounts due, payments made, and the balance due
through

January

31,

1986,

on

the

contract

between

ELSIE

BRINKERBOFF, MARK J. BRINKERBOFF, and CLOYD B* BRINKERBOFF:

CONTRACT ACCOOHTIHG
(6% interest on delinquent amounts
accruing prior to Hay 14, 1981)
NOV

1, 1964

Payment due
Payment made

5 2,000.00
• 2,000.00
-0-

NOV

1, 1965

Payment due
Payment made

•

2,000.00

NOV

1, 1966

Payment due

NOV

lr 1967

1 year interest
at 6% on $2,000

1, 1968

1 year interest
at 6% on $4,000

1, 1969

1 year interest
at 6% on $6,000

NOV

1, 1970

1 year interest
at 6% on $8,000

-6-

$720 accrued interest, $8,000
principal

480.00
2,000.00
11,200.00

Payment due

$360 accrued interest, $6,000
principal

360.00
2,000.00
8,720.00

Payment due

$120 accrued in
terest, $4,000
principal

240.00
2,000.00
6,360.00

Payment due

NOV

120.00
2,000.00
4,120.00

Payment due

NOV

2,000.00
2,000.00
-0-

$1,200 accrued interest, $10,000
principal

NOV

1, 1971

600.00

1 year interest
at 6% on 510,000

2,000.00
13,800.00

Payment due

JON 17, 1972

451.72

229 days interest
at 6% on $12,000
Payment made

430.75
13 , 8 2 0 .97

NOV

1, 1972

2 , 0 0 0 .00
16 , 0 9 1 . 2 2

MAR 19, 1973

^

OCT 26, 1973

1, 1973

$1,348.04 accrued
interest, $14,000
principal

280. .76
5 0 0 . ,00
1 5 , , 1 2 8 . 80

—m

^

6 days interest
at 6% on $14,000

-7-

$1,128.80 accrued
interest, $14,000
principal

5 0 8 . 60

221 days interest
at 6% on $14,000
Payment made

NOV

780, .00
15 , 3 4 8 , .04

122 days interest
at 6% on $14,000
Payment made

$2,091.22 accrued
interest, $14,000
principal

36 . 8 2

16 days interest
at 6% on $14,000
Payment made

$1,820.97 accrued
interest, $12,000
principal

270 . 2 5

137 days interest
at 6% on $12,000
Payment due

NOV 17, 1972

$1,800 accrued interest, $12,000
principal

5 0 0 . 00
1 5 , 1 3 7 . 40

13.81

$1,137.40 accrued
interest, $14,000
principal

Payment due

NOV 28, 1973

27 days interest
at 6% on 516,000
Payment made

MAY 13, 1974

166 days interest
at 6% on $16,000
Payment made

NOV 1, 1974

172 days interest
at 6% on $16,000
Payment due

JAN 20, 1975

80 days interest
at 6% on $18,000
Payment made

NOV
N

1, 1975

285 days interest
at 6% on $18,000
Payment due

DEC 15, 1975

44 days interest
at 6% on $20,000
Payment made

NOV

1, 1976

321 days interest
at 6% on $20,000
-8-

2.000.00
17,151.21

$1,151.21 accrued
interest, $16,000
principal

71.01
780.00
16,442.22

$442.22 accrued
interest, $16,000
principal

436.60
500.00
16,378.82

$378.82 accrued
interest, $16,000
principal

452.38
2,000.00
18,831.20

$831.20 accrued
interest, $18,000
principal

236.71
600.00
1 8 , r 4 6 7 . 91

$467.91 accrued
interest, $18,000
principal

8 4 3 . 28
2,LpOO..00
21 , 3 1 1 . ; i 9

$1,311.19. accrued
interest, $20,000
principal

144, .66
500 .00
20 7955 .85

1 , 0 5 5 .34

$955.85 accrued
interest, $20,000
principal

2,000.00
24,011.19

Payment due

DEC

1, 1976

30 days interest
at 6% on $22,000

NOV

1, 1977

335 days interest
at 6% on $22,000

1, 1978

1 year interest
at 6% on $24,000

NOV

1, 1979

1 year interest
at 6% on $26,000

NOV 13, 1979

NOV

1, 1980

12 days interest
at 6% on $28,000

706.00

Payment made

- 1,300.00
31,980.42

Payment due

$3,980.42 accrued
interest, $28,000
principal

1,624.77
., 2,000.00
35,605.19

-9-

$5,931.19 accrued
interest, $28,000
principal

55.23

Payment made

353 days interest
at 6% on $28,000

$4,371.19 accrued
interest, $26,000
principal

1,560.00
2,000.00
33,931.19

Payment due

$2,931.19 accrued
interest, $22,000
principal

1,440.00
2,000.00
30,371.19

Payment due

$1,719.68 accrued
interest, $22,000
principal

1,211.51
2,000.00
26,931.19

Payment due

NOV

108.49
400.00
23,719.68

Payment made

$2,011.19 accrued
interest, $22,000
principal

$5,605.19 accrued
interest, $30,000
principal

JAN 3 1 , 1986

5 y e a r s , 92 days
i n t e r e s t at 6% on
$30,000

9,453.69

Payment made
post-trial after
ruling by Court

-50,262.95

CREDIT (Applied
below)

( 5,204.07)

CONTRACT ACCODHTIHG
(10% interest on delinqoent amounts
accruing after Ray 14, 1981)
NOV

1, 1981

Payment due

NOV

1, 1982

1 year interst at
10% on $2,000.00

$ 2,000.00

2,000.00
4,200.00

Payment due

NOV

1, 1983

1 year interest at
10% on $4,000.00

6, 1983

5 days inteest at
10% on $6,000.00

NOV

1, 1984

360 days Interest
at 10% on $4,608.22

NOV

4, 1984

3 days interest at
10% on $6,608.22

-10-

$454.51 accrued
interest $6,608.22
principal

5.43
2,000.00
5,068.16

Payment made

$4,608.22 principal

454.51
2,000.00
7,062.73

Payment due

$600.00 accrued
interest, $6,000
principal

8.22
- 2,000.00
4,608.22

Payment made

$200.00 accrued
interest, $4,000
principal

400.00
2,000.00
6,600.00

Payment due

NOV

200.00

$5,068.16 principal

NOV

1, 1985

361 days interest
at 10% on $5,068.16
Payment due

NOV 15, 1985

2,000.00
7,569.42

14 days interest at
10% on $7,068.16
Payment made

JAN 31, 1986

$501.26 interest,
7,068.16 principal

27.11
- 2,115.00
5,481.53

77 days interest at
at 10% on $5,481.53
CREDIT APPLIED

14.

501.26

$5,481.53 principal

115.64
- 5,204.07
$
399.10

$399.10 principal

As of the date of trial in February of 1985, ELSIE

BRINKERBOFF

was

86

years

of

age,

and

is

a

wonderful

and

beautifully aged lady.
15.

The Court finds by the clear and convincing weight of

the evidence presented at trial that, although ELSIE BRINKERBOFF
was fully competent in all senses of the word at the time she
entered into the agreement between herself as seller and MARK J.
BRINKERBOFF and CLOYD B. BRINKERBOFF as buyers, in 1966 or 1967,
because

of

her

age, and

beginning

BRINKERBOFF

had

to

on

rely

others

in or
to

do

about 1970, ELSIE
things

for

her,

especially concerning her financial and legal affairs, and she
has relied upon her sons, daughters, members of her family, and
grandsons, and that from and after 1970, ELSIE BRINKERBOFF signed
documents that were presented to her without understanding the
legal

or

other

significance

of such documents.

She lacked

sufficient power to comprehend the subject of such documents,
including

will, deeds, contracts and promissory
-11-

notes, their

nature, and their probable consequences, and was not able to act
with discretion in relation thereto.

From and after 1970, ELSIE

J. BRINKERBOFF was and still is, legally incompetent,
17.

From and after 1970, when ELSIE BRINKERBOFF signed any

contractual, financial or legal documents, or took certain legal
stands and positions, she did so in total and strict reliance
upon her sons, daughters, grandsons or whomever else came to her
requesting
legal

her signature or

positionsf

requesting

all without

that she take certain

knowing the nature and probable

consequences of such documents, and without knowing the nature
and

probable

consequences

of

the

legal

positions

she

was

requested to take.
18.

The Court finds that the purpose of the 1966 or 1967

Agreement was to furnish ELSIE BRINKERBOFF with support for as
long as she lived, and that Agreement and that purpose were never
abandoned.
19.

The Court finds that all of the children and certain

grandchildren

of

ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF,

from

their

respective

viewpoints, and because of what they perceived as being others
taking advantage of their mother or grandmother by such other
parties, used their own influence to convince ELSIE BRINKERBOFF
to

execute

documents

and

take

legal

positions

in order

to

accomplish what they, the children and/or grandchildren or other
relatives, thought was for ELSIE BRINKERBOFF1 s best interest.
20.

The Court finds that the children and grandchildren who

prevailed upon ELSIE BRINKERBOFF to execute documents and take
legal stands after 1970 did not intend to take advantage of her
-12-

for their own purposes. Nevertheless, they did take advantage of
ELSIE BRINKERHOPF for the purpose of benefiting her in their own
minds, fro© their own points of view.

As a result, those persons

who persuaded and induced ELSIE BRINKERBOFF to sign contractual,
legal

and

certain

financial

legal

documents,

positions

from

including
and

after

deeds,

and

1970,

used

to

take

improper

constraint or urgency of pursuasion, whereby the will of ELSIE
BRINKERBOFF

was

overpowered,

and

she

was

induced

to

do

or

forebear an act which she otherwise would not do, or otherwise
would do if left to act freely.
21.

The unfair persuasion of ELSIE BRINKERHOPF on various

occasions from and after 1970 generally took place in private.
The persons pursuading her to sign legal and financial documents
were

able

to

obtain

her

signature

because

of

her

age,

psychological dependency, and existing confidential and/or family
relationships.
22.

The transactions leading to the signing of financial and

legal documents by ELSIE BRINKERBOFF were initiated by her family
members,

not

BRINKERBOFF

by

herself/

lacked

under

circumstances

reasonable

access

in

to

which

ELSIE

independent,

non-confidential advice.
23.

Following 1970, ELSIE BRINKERBOFF executed the following

financial and legal documents, among others:
A.

On

or

about

April

ELSIE

BRINKERBOFF

executed a certain affidavit, admitted

in evidence

as Exhibit P-3.

•13-

13,

1971,

B.

On or about April 6, 1977, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF signed
a

document

$23,000

acknowledging

from

BRINKERHOFF
prepared

MARK
as

by

BRINKERHOFF1S
Certified

J.

of

that

had

BRINKERHOFF

that

date.

Plaintiff

MONT

grandson-in-lawf

Public

she

and

The

received
CLOYD

receipt

ANDERSON,
who

Accountant.

was

The

H.
was

ELSIE

and

is a

receipt

was

prepared by him for the benefit of giving MARK J.
BRINKERHOFF and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF certain "tax
breaks"/ and the receipt was prepared and obtained
without

regard to the tax conseguences for ELSIE

BRINKERBOFF.

The receipt was admitted as Exhibit

P-4.
C.

On or about June 4, 1979, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF executed
a Warranty Deed running from herself, as grantor, to
herself,

MARK

J.

BRINKERHOFF,

BRINKERHOFF, as joint tenants.

and

CLOYD

H.

This document was

admitted as Exhibit D-5.
D

On or about August 15, 1980, ELSIE BRINKERBOFF was
induced
herself,

to execute
as

BRINKERBOFF,
BRINKERHOFF,

a Warranty

grantor,
ARLENE

B.

running from

B. ADAIR,

GOOLDING,

WARREN

CHARLES

A.

and BETTY B. ESPLIN, each as to an

undivided 1/5 interest.
E.

to GOLDA

Deed

See Exhibit D-6.

On or following August 15, 1980, GOLDA B. ADAIR,
WARREN BRINKERBOFF, ARLENE B. GOULDING, CHARLES A.
BRINKERHOFF, and BETTY B. ESPLIN executed a Trust
-14-

Deed in favor of ELSIE BRINKERBOFF as beneficiary.
See Exhibit D-7. The Trust Deed was to secure notes
running to ELSIE BRINKERBOFF, one being executed by
each of the grantors named in the Trust Deed.

See

Exhibit D-20.
F.

Also on or about August 15, 1980, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF
was induced to execute certain "Escrow Agreements".
See Exhibit D-20.

G.

On or about September 9, 1980, ELSIE BRINKERBOFF was
induced

to execute

a Quit

Claim Deed, conveying

interests in water rights to GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN
BRINKERBOFF,

ARLENE

B.

GODLDING,

CHARLES

A.

BRINKERHOFF, and BETTY B. ESPLIN, each as to an
undivided 1/5 interest.
H.

See Exhibit D-8.

On or about September 9, 1980, ELSIE BRINKERBOFF was
induced to execute a certain affidavit.

See Exhibit

D-21.
I.

On

or

executed

about

April

a

document

23,

1982,

entitled

ELSIE
"Last

BRINKERHOFF
Will

and

Testament of ELSIE BRINKERHOFF".
J.

On or about September 9, 1984, ELSIE BRINKERBOFF was
induced to execute a certain

"Stipulation".

See

Exhibit P-40.
24.

The Court specifically finds that with respect to each

and all of the documents listed in the preceding paragraph, the
same

were

signed

incompetent,

by ELSIE BRINKERHOFF

and was acting

and

-15-

when

functioning

she was legally
under

the undue

influence

of the persons who obtained

requested

her

documents.

to take the legal
As

contractual

a

result,

financial

and

the

her

signature,

positions
Court

indicated

finds

testamentary

that

documents

or who
by said

all

legal,

executed

by

ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF from and after 1970, as between and as
related to the parties to this action, are null, void, and of no
force or effect whatever, and should be declared cancelled.
25.

On or about August 15, 1980, GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN

BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. GOOLDING, CHARLES A. BRINKBRHOFP and BETTY
B. ESPLIN executed notes in favor of ELSIE J. BRINKERBOPP in
connection
Agreement

with

the Warranty

mentioned

Deed,

Trust

Deed,

in paragraphs 23D, 23 E, and

and

Escrow

23F, above.

Thereafter, certain payments were made by the promisors to ELSIE
J. BRINKERHOFP.

The notes bore interest at the rate of *NONE

percent (0%) per annum*.
26.

At trial, the Court inquired of GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN

BRINKERBOPP,

ARLENE B. GOOLDING, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFP, and

BETTY B, ESPLIN whether they desired the return of funds paid by
them to ELSIE J. BRINKBRHOFP under the transactions mentioned in
light of the Court's ruling that said transactions were null,
void, and of no effect*

CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFP an£ BETTY B.

ESPLIN informed the Court that they did not desire any repayment.
Defendants GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERBOFF, and ARLENE B.
GOOLDING requested that their money be returned to them by ELSIE
J,

BRINKERHOPF,

who

requested

that

the

Court

grant

her the

privilege of repaying said Defendants.

The Court finds that the

notes

Trust

to

ELSIE

J.

BRINKERBOFF,
-16-

the

Deed,

the

Escrow

Agreement and all other documents related to the transactions
described

above are null, void, of no effect

and should be

cancelled and set aside.
27.

As

of

February

28, 1985,

ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF is

indebted to Defendants GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERBOFF, AND
ARLENE B. GOOLDING in the principal amount of $1,620.00 plus
accrued interest at the rate of 10% per annum in the amount of
$356.40, for a total amount of $1,976.40, each.
28.
ELSIE

As stated in paragraph 7, above, the contract between
J.

BRINKERBOFF,

BRINKERBOFF

was

and

MARK

J.

is vague

BRINKERBOFF,

and ambiguous

and
with

CLOYD

H.

respect to

disposition of any portion of the $53,388.00 minimum which might
remain unpaid as of the date of death of ELSIE J* BRINKERBOFF.
The Court finds that it was the intent of the parties to the
contract that any part of the minimum amount remaining unpaid as
of the death of ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF be paid and divided equally
between

her

children,

or

any

surviving

heirs

if

any child

predeceased her, and the contract should be reformed to express
clearly this disposition and intent*

As of the dates of trial,

all children of ELSIE J» BRINKERBOFF, including the surviving
spouse of CLOTD H* BRINKERBOFF, consented to such reformation,
with the exception of Defendants ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERBOFF, and
GOOLDING, who originally agreed to such reformation but changed
their minds.

Likewise as of the time of trial, all children of

ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF except Defendants ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERBOFF,
and GOOLDING were in agreement that any and all funds left in a
trust account mentioned below, as of the date of death of ELSIE
-17-

J. BRINKERBOFF, be divided and distributed equally between them
and LENA BRINKERBOFF.

Defendants ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERBOFF and

GOOLDING originally agreed, but changed their minds.

The Court

finds that all funds referred to in this paragraph should be
distributed, upon the death of ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF, equally to
her children, with LENA BRINKERBOFF receiving the share allocable
to her deceased husband, GLOYD B. BRINKERBOFF.
29.

Any amounts awarded to ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF should be

paid to Mr* Kirk Beaton in trust for the benefit of ELSIE J.
BRINKERBOFF, and for the use and benefit of her now-surviving
children and LENA BRINKERBOFF.

Mr. Beaton was present in Court

at the time of the Court's ruling and consented to be appointed
as trustee and guardian of the financial, business and legal
affairs of ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF, under the supervision of the
Court.

Mr. Kirk Beaton should be appointed as such trustee and

guardian for the purpose of receiving such funds awarded to ELSIE
J. BRINKERBOFF, depositing them in a trust account at Eion's
First National Bank, and disbursing them appropriately, but not
to any of ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF1 S children except as specifically
ordered

by^ the

Court.

He

should

qualify

by

taking

the

appropriate oath, and should serve without bond or any stated
fee, but should be permitted to apply to the Court for reasonable
fees upon appropriate showing and notice.
30.
Bishop,

When this action vas originally commenced, Willard R.
attorney

BRINKERBOFF
interests ot

and

for
other

Plaintiffs,
naaed

ELSIE BRINKERBOFF
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brought

Defendants.
were

suit

against

ELSIE

Thereafter,

represented

by

Bans

the
Q.

Chamberlain, who also represented other named Defendants.

ELSIE

BRINKERHOPF then requested in writing that Bans Q. Chamberlain
withdraw as her attorney of record, which he did in September of
1983.

The letter wherein she requested Bans Q. Chamberlain to

withdraw

as her

BRINKERBOFP.

attorney was prepared

by her grandson, DALE

Thereafter, following signing of the September 9,

1984 Stipulation by ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFP, and following receipt
of a w itten request from ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF dated October 16,
1984f Willard R. Bishop, entered an appearance on her behalf and
represented

ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF even though he had originally

sued her on behalf of Plaintiffs in the first instance,

Hans Q.

Chamberlain had by then sued ELSIE J, BRINKERBOFF in behalf of
the other named Defendants even though he originally represented
her, by a Crossclaim dated September 28f 1984.
31.
1985,

During the first day of trial, to-wit, February 21st,
the

Court

determined

that

the

interests

of

ELSIE

BRINKERBOFF were not being fully protected, and by reason of that
fact, she needed separate counsel to represent her interests.
The Court deteruined that it would watch out for the interests of
SLSIE BRINKERBOFF, and that the trial would continue without
obtaining
trial.

counsel

to represent her during the course of the

Therefore, during part of the first day of trial and

during the entire second day of trial, ELSIE BRINKERBOFF was not
represented by counsel.
From the foregoing Findings of Pact, the Court now makes and
enters its;

-19-

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That

contractual

any

and/or

and

all

other

legal,

financial,

documents

executed

testamentary,
by

ELSIE

J.

BRINKERBOFF from and after the year 1970, as between and as
related to the parties to this action, were and are null, void
and of no effect by reason of the legal incompetency of ELSIE J.
BRINKERBOFF and the exercise of undue

influence over her in

connection with the execution of said documents, by certain of
her children and grandchidren, and should be declared to be null,
void, cancelled terminated, and of no effect whatever, as should
any

promissory notes, trust deeds, escrow agreements and any

other documents executed by others, but related thereto.
2.

The Agreement between ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF as seller, and

MARK J. BRINKERBOFF and CLOYD B. BRINKERBOFF, deceased, dated
October 26, 1966 or December 10, 1967r

is and at all times

pertinent has been, in existence, and in full force and effect.
3.

That the vague and ambiguous terms of said Agreement

pertaining to disposition of any part of the minimum amount of
$53,388.00

remaining

unpaid

as

of

the

death

of

ELSIE

J.

BRINKERBOFF, should be reformed to provide for an equal division
of any amounts so remaining between MARK J. BRINKERBOFF, LENA
BRIKKERBOFP, CBARLBS A. BRIHKERBOFF, BBCTY B. ESPLIN, GOLDA B.
ADAIR, KARREH BRIHKERBOFF, and ARLENE B. GOOLDING, share and
share alike.
4.
title

Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment and a decree quieting
with

appropriate

injunctive

relief

in

favor

of

LENA

BRINKERBOFF and MARK J. BRINKERBOFF in the real and personal
-20-

property, grazing rights and water rights which are the subject
matter

of

this action, as tenants in common, each owning an

undivided one-half (H) interest therein, subject to the terms of
the Agreement dated October 26, 1966 or December 10, 1967, as
reformed,

running to ELSIE J. BRINKEREOFF as seller, free and

clear of any claim whatever on the part of Defendants GOLDA B.
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKEREOFF, and ARLENE B. 60ULDING.

Because of

the legal incompetency of ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF, upon payment of
all amounts due under said Agreement, any judgment and decree
issued in this matter should function and operate as a judicial
deed

conveying

BRINKERBOFF,

to

Plaintiffs

MARK

J.

BRINKERBOFF

the interests stated above.

and

LENA

In the event that

Plaintiffs deem it necessary, a judicial deed should issue upon
appropriate application and notice.
5.

That Mr. Kirk Beaton should be appointed as trustee and

guardian of the financial, business and legal affairs of ELSIE J.
BRINKERBOFF, under the supervision of the Court, he to take the
appropriate oath and to serve without bond or stated fee.
such

As

trustee and guardian, Mr. Beaton should receive amounts

^awarded

SLSIB J* BRINKERBOFF, should deposit them in a trust

"account at lion's First National Bank, and should disburse such
funds for the benefit of SLSIE J. BRINKERBOFF, but not to her
7

children, except as such disbursements to children may be ordered
by the Court.

Upon appropriate notice, Mr. Beaton should be

permitted to apply for reasonable fees in his capacity as trustee
and guardian of the financial business and legal affairs of ELSIE
r
t

J.

BRINKERBOFF.

Mr.

Beaton

should
-21-

be

permitted

to pay his

J

reasonable costs incurred for his administration of the account,
from the account.
6. That Plaintiffs should be required to pay to Kirk Heaton,
in trust for the use and benefit of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, the
amounts due on the Agreement as stated above, plus any accrued
interest, said amounts to be paid within ninety (90) days of the
execution of any judgment by the Court in this matter.
7.

That from amounts received by Mr. Kirk Beaton for the

benefit of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, Mr. Beaton should be required to
disburse to Defendants GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, and
ARLENE B. GOOLDING, the amount of $1,976.40 each, together with
interest upon said amount at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per
annum from and after March lf 1985, all without further order of
this Court.
8.
in

his

That upon the death of ELSIE J* BRINKERHOFF, Kirk Beaton,
capacity

as trustee, should

be

required

to pay and

distribute any and all funds still being held by him in trust for
ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, together with any funds received by him
thereafter in connection with the Agreement of October 26, 1966
or December 10, 1967, to MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, LENA BRINKERHOFF,
BETTY Be ESPLIN, CHARLES A. BRINKERSOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN
BRINKERHOFF, and ARLENE B. GOOLDISG equally, share and share
alike,
9.

That

all

other

claims

and

pleadings

of

any

party

requesting affirmative relief other than or inconsistent with the
above conclusions, should be dismissed, with prejudice and upon
the merits^
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10.

The p a t t i e s should be required to bear t h e i r own c o s t s

and a t t o r n e y

fees.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
DATED t h i s ,%? ~ d a y of

/lp\fjtf

'*/

1986.

BY THEZCQtrRTi

:^u^..

1

v*
DON V.^TIBBS, D i s t r i c t Judge

\
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Ufl
WILLARD R. B I S H O P ^ T
Attorney for Plaintiffs N

HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN
<t
Attorney for Defendants ADAIR,
GOOLDING, and WARREN BRINKERBOFF
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I sailed a full, true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing FIRST AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to Mr. Hans Q. Chamberlain, of CHAMBERLAIN &
HIGBEE, Attorneys at Law, 250 South Main Street, Cedar City, Utah"
•*

• *>

'"

-

-T_

—

84720; to Mr. Xirk Heaton, Attorney at Law, 70 North Main Street,
Kanab, Utah 84741; and to Mrs. Elsie J. Brinkerhoff, Glendale,
Utah 84729,

<2gHday of

all by first class mail,

fe&gOAgV

postage fully prepaid this

, 1986.

c JMmju^kijwD
-fctn
•23-
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*

'""^

WILLARD R. BISHOP
BISHOP & RONNOK, P. C.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
P. 0. Box 27 9
Cedar City, DT 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-9483
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MONT R. ANDERSON, personal
representative of the Estate
of CLOYD B. BRINKERBOFF,
LENA BRINKERBOFF, and MARK J.
BRINKERBOFF,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
ELSIE BRINKERBOFF, GOLDAB.
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERBOFF,
ARLENE B. GOULDING, and JOBN
DOES I through V,
Defendants.

I,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

FIRST AMENDED JUDGMENT AND
DECREE Q01BTING TITLE

Civil No. 1826

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial to the
Court, sitting without a jury, on Thursday and Friday, February
21

and

22, 1985.

representative

of

Plaintiffs MONT R. ANDERSON, as personal
the

Estate

of

CLOYD

B. BRINKERBOFF, LENA

BRINKERBOFF and MARK J. BRINKERBOFF all appeared personally and
were

represented

Bishop.

by their

counsel of

record, Mr. Willard R.

Defendant ELSIE BRINKERBOFF appeared personally and was

represented by her attorney of record, Mr. Willard R. Bishop.
Defendants GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERBOFF, and ARLENE B.
GODLDING also appeared personally, and were represented by their
attorney

of

record,

Mr.

Bans

Q.

Chamberlain.

BRINKERBOFF and BETTY B. ESPLIN were present.

CBARLES

A.

The Court noted

bat originally, CEARLES A. BRINKERBOFF and BETTY B. ESPLIN had
been named as Defendants, but had been dismissed from the lawsuit
by

reason of having settled their differences with Plaintiffs.

Witnesses were sworned and evidence was presented.
had.

Argument was

The Court being fully advised in the premises, and having

heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, and good cause appearing,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as
follows:
1.

That

contractual

any

and

and/or

all

other

legal,

documents

financial,

testamentary,

executed

by

ELSIE

J.

BRINKERBOFF from and after 1970, as between and as related to the
parties to this action, were and are now, null, void, and of no
effect whatever, by reason of the legal incompetency of ELSIE J.
BRINKERBOFF and by reason of the exercise of undue influence over
her

in

certain
should

connection
of
be

with

her children
and

they

the

execution

of

said

and grandchildren,

hereby

are,

declared

documents,

and said
to

be

by

documents

null,

void,

cancelled, terminated, and of no effect whatever, together with
any

and

all

related

promissory

notes,

trust

deeds,

escrow

agreements, and any and all other documents executed by others
related to in any way to the null and void documents executed by
ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF*

The documents which are hereby declared

null, void and of no effect include, but are not limited to, the
following:
A.

A certain affidavit executed by ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF
on or about April 13, 1971.
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A certain document executed by ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF
on or about April

6, 1977, acknowledging

that she

had received $23,000.00 from MARK J. BRINKERHOFF and
CLOYD B. BRINKERHOFF as of that date.
A certain Warranty Deed dated June 4, 1975, running
from ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, as grantor, to herself,
MARK

J. BRINKERHOFF,

and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF,

as

joint tenants.
A

certain

Warranty

running from
GOLDA

B.

GODLDING,
ESPLIN,

dated

August

ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF,

ADAIR,

WARREN

CHARLES

each

Deed

as

A.
to

an

undivided

1980,

as grantor, to

BRINKERHOFF,

BRINKERHOFF,

15,

and

ARLENE

B.

BETTY

B.

one-fifth

(1/5)

interest.
A certain Trust

Deed executed

by GOLDA B. ADAIR,

WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B, GODLDING, CHARLES A.
BRINKERHOFF, and BETTY B. ESPLIN, running to ELSIE
J.

BRINKERHOFF,

certain

trust

as
deed

beneficiary,
notes

running

together
to

ELSIE

with
J.

BRINKERHOFF from GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF,
ARLENE

B.

GODLDING,

BETTY B. ESPLIN,

CHARLES

executed

A.

BRINKER0OFF,

on or about

and

August 15,

1930.
Certain 'Escrow Agreements* dated August 15, 1980,
executed by ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, and by GOLDA B.
ADAIR,

WARREN

BRINKERHOFF,

ARLENE

B.

GOULDING,

CHARLES A. BRINFERBOFF, and BETTY B. ESPLIN.

G.

A

certain

Quit-Claim

Deed,

purporting

to

convey

interests in water rights to GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN
BRINKERBOFF,

ARLENE

BRINKERHOFF,
undivided

and

B.

GOULDING,

BETTY

one-fifth

B.

ESPLIN,

(1/5)

CHARLES

A.

each

to

an

executed

by

interest,

ELSIE BRINKERBOFF on or about September 9, 1980.
H.

A certain affidavit, executed by ELSIE BRINKERHOFF
on or about September 9, 1980.

I.

A

certain

"Last

BRINKERBOFF",

Will

executed

and
by

Testament

of

ELSIE

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF on or

about April 23, 1982.
J.

A

certain

"Stipulation"

executed

by

ELSIE

BRINKERBOFF on or about September 9, 1984.
2.
seller,

That
and

the
MARK

agreement
J.

between

BRINKERHOFF

ELSIE

and

J.

CLOYD

BRINKERHOFF
H.

as

BRINKERHOFF,

deceased, dated October 26, 1966 or December 10, 1967, should be
and it hereby is, declared to be in existence, and in full force
and effect.
3.

That

disposition

the

of

any

terms
part

of

of

the

said

agreement

minimum

amount

pertaining
of

to

553,388.00

remaining unpaid as of the death of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, should
be

and

they

hereby

are,

reformed,

to

provide

for

an

equal

division of any amounts so remaining between MARK J. BRINKERHOFF,
LENA BRINKERBOFF, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF, BETTY B. ESPLIN, GOLDA
B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERBOFF, and ARLENE B. GOULDING, share and
share alike.
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4.

That Plaintiffs LENA BRINKERHOFF and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF,

own in fee simple and are entitled to the quiet and peaceful use,
possession

and

enjoyment

of

that

certain

real

and

personal

property, including grazing rights and water rights, as tenants
in

common,

each

owning

an

undivided

one-half

(**)

interest

therein, subject to the terms of the Agreement dated October 26,
1966, or December 10, 1967, as reformed,

running to ELSIE J.

BRINKERBOFF as seller, said real and personal property, including
grazing and water rights, being more particularly described as
follows:
REAL PROPERTY IN MILLARD COOHTY, DTAH:
Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4, Block 25, Plat "A", Delta
Townsite.
Lot 2, Block 26, Plat "A", Delta Townsite.
REAL PROPERTY IN KANE COUNTY, DTAB:
Township 39 South, Range 4^ West, Salt Lake
Meridian:
West Half of Section 25, containing 320 acres*
Northwest Quarter? Southeast Quarter and the
South Half of the Northeast Quarter containing
400 acres, all in Section 26, Township 39
South, Range 4H West, Salt Lake Meridian,
containing 400 acres, more or less.
Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4; Southeast Quarter of the
Northwest Quarter; Northeast Quarter of the..
Southwest Quarter; East Half of the East Half;
Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter;
Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of
Section 27, Township 39 South, Range Ah West,
containing 478.80 acres.
East Half of the Northeast Quarter? South Half
of the Southeast Quarter; Northwest Quarter of
the
Southeast
Quarter
of
Section
35,
containing 200 acres.
c

Township 40 South, Range 4H West, Salt Lake
Meridian:
Section 29:
Southwest Quarter of the
Northeast Quarter; West Half of the Southeast
Quarter and the Southeast Quarter of the
Southwest Quarter, containing 160 acres.
Section 30: Northwest Quarter; East Half of
the Southwest Quarter, containing 238.99
acres.
Section 5:

Lot 2, containing 39.08 acres.

Township 40 South, Range 4 West, Salt Lake
Meridian:
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of
Section 8, containing 40 acres.
Township 40 South, Range 7 West, Salt Lake
Meridian:
Beginning at the Southwest Corner of the
Southwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of
Section 23, Township 40 South, Range 7 West,
Salt Lake Meridian and running thence Cast
10.23 chains; thence North 80° West 6.36
chains; thence West 3.68 chains; thence South
1 chain to beginning, containing .74 acres.
Beginning at the Northwest Corner of the
Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of
Section 26, Township 40 South, Range 7 West,
and running thence South 4.30 chains; thence
South 70° East 15 chains to the middle of the
channel of the creek; thence Northwesterly
along the middle of the channel of said creek
to the North line of said Northwest Quarter of
the Northeast Quarter; thence West 11.23
chains to the place of beginning.
Beginning 4.30 chains South of the Northwest*'
Corner of the Northwest Quarter of the
Northeast Quarter of Section 26, Township 40
South, Range 7 West, Salt Lake Meridian and
running thence South 70°east 15 chains to the
middle of the channel of the creek; thence
Southerly along the middle of the channel of
said creek to the South Line; thence North 73
45' Kest 14.60 chains; thence North 4.30
chains to the place of beginning, containing
5.60 acres.
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The above three tracts being part of land
situtated in Sections 23 and 26 of said
township and range, sometimes referred to
unofficially as Lot "A".
Township 40 South, Range Ah West, Salt Lake
Meridian:
Lot 1; Northeast Quarter of the Northwest
Quarter of Section 31, containing 79.30 acres.
PERSONAL PROPERTY:
The following described water and reservoir
rights:
A one-fourth
interest
in Hobble Canyon
Reservoir (9-36-12) in Mohave County, Arizona,
A one-half interest in Sullivan Reservoir in
Mohave County, Arizona.
And all grazing privileges and permits annexed
to or based upon any of the foregoing real,
personal, reservoir, or water rights as
commensurate.
5.

That the claims of Defendants GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN

BRINKERBOFF, and ARLENE B. GODLDING, and the claims of any and
all persons claiming with, by, through or under said Defendants,
are without any right whatever, and Defendants GOLDA B. ADAIR,
WARREN

BRINKERBOFF,

and

ARLENE B. GOOLDING

and

any

and all

persons claiming with, by, through or under them, have no estate,
right, title, lien or interest in or to said property or any part
thereof*
6.

That Defendants GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, and

ARLENE B. GOOLDING, and any and all persons claiming with, by,
through or under them, should be and they hereby are, permanently
enjoined and restrained from claiming any estate, right, title,
lien or interest in or to the described property or any part
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thereof adverse to the interests and title of MARK J. BRINKERHOFF
and LENA BRINKERBOFF.
7.

That

because

of the legal

incompetency

of ELSIE J.

BRINKERBOFF and the fact that a complete set of documents of
conveyance was never deposited into the escrow anticipated by the
agreement

dated October 26, 1966 or December

10, 1967, this

Judgment and Decree Quieting Title shall, upon the death of ELSIE
J. BRINKERBOFF, function and operate as a judicial deed conveying
to MARK J. BRINKERBOFF and LENA BRINKERBOFF the interests stated
above.

In

the

event

that

MARK

J.

BRINKERBOFF

and/or LENA

BRINKERBOFF deem it necessary, a judicial deed shall issue upon
appropriate application and notice.
8.
and

That Mr. Kirk Beaton, Attorney, of Kanab, Dtah, should be

he

business

hereby

is, appointed

and legal

as

guardian

affairs of ELSIE J.

of

the financial,

BRINKERBOFF,

and as

trustee of all funds flowing to ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF from the
Agreement of October 26, 1966 or December 10, 1967, for the use
and benefit of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, and also for the use and
benefit
ESPLIN,

of

MARK

J.

CHARLES

A.

BRINKERBOFF,

BRINKERBOFF,
BRINKERBOFF,

LENA

BRINKERBOFF,

GOLDA

B.

BETTY B.

ADAIR,

WARREN

and ARLERE B* GOOLDING, said appointments being

subject to the supervision of this Court.

Mr. Kirk Beaton shall

take the appropriate oath and shall serve without bond or stated
fee.

As such trustee, Mr. Beaton shall

receive all amounts

awarded ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF herein, together with any proceeds
from the agreement dated October 26, 1366 or December 10, 1967,
as reformed above, and shall deposit them into a trust account at
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Zion's First National Bank, and shall

hold and disburse such

funds for the use and benefit of ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF, but not to
her children, except as such disbursements to children may be
specifically
Court.

authorized

herein#

or

otherwise

ordered

by the

Upon appropriate application and notice, Mr. Kirk Heaton

shall be permitted to apply for reasonable fees in connection
with his administration of the trust, and in connection with his
guardianship of the financial, business and legal affairs of
ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF.

Mr. Kirk Beaton shall be permitted to

deduct his reasonable and normal costs incurred in connection
with his administration of the trust, from the trust corpus.
9.

That Plaintiffs should be and they hereby are, required

to pay to Kirk Heaton, as trustee, for the use and benefit of
ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF and for the use and benefit of MARK J.
BRINKERBOFF, LENA H. BRINKERBOFF, BETTY B. ESPLIN, CHARLES A.
BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERBOFF, and ARLENE B.
GOULDING, the sum of $399.10, being the amount due and unpaid on
the agreement as of January 31, 1986, plus any accrued interest
at ten percent

(10%) per annum upon principal, and less any

payments made after January 31 f

1986, said amount to be paid

within ninety (90) days of the execution of this Fitfit

Amended

Judgment, Plaintiffs having already paid the sum of $50/262.S5 on
January 31, 1986, and $2,115.00 on November 15, 1985, after the
initial ruling by the Court.
10.

That from amounts received by Mr. Kirk Beaton as stated

above, and as received by him prior to February 1, 1986, Mr.
Beaton should be and he hereby is, required to disburse forthwith
-9-

to Defendant GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERBOFF, and ARLENE B.
GOULDING, the amount of $1,916.40

each, together with interest

upon said amounts at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum
from and after March 1, 1985, all without further order of this
Court.
11.

That upon the death of ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF, Mr. Kirk

Beaton, in his capacity as trustee, should be and he hereby is,
required to pay and distribute any and all funds still being held
by him in trust at the death of ELSIE J. BRINKERBOFF, together
with any funds received by him thereafter in connection with the
agreement of October 26, 1966 or December 10, 1967, to MARK J.
BRINKERBOFF,

LENA

BRINKERBOFF,

BETTY

B.

ESPLIN,

CHARLES

A.

BRINKERBOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERBOFF, and ARLENE B.
GOOLDING equally, share and share alike.
12.

That any and all other claims and pleadings of any party

in this action
inconsistent

requesting

affirmative

relief, other

with the above, should be and

than or

they hereby are,

dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits.
13.

That the parties should be and they hereby are, required

to bear their own costs and attorney fees.
DATED this 20

1986.

f^hVuA + y

day of
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DON V. TIBBS, District Judge

WILLARD R. BISHOP
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f s

\
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HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN
. Attorney for Defendants ADAIR,
MOULDING, and WARREN BRINKERHOPF
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing FIRST AMENDED JUDGMENT AND DECREE
QDIETING TITLE, to Mr. Bans Q. Chamberlain, of CHAMBERLAIN &
HIGBEE, Attorneys at Law, 250 South Main Street, Cedar City, Otah
84720; to Mr. Kirk Beaton, Attorney at Law, 70 North Main Street,
Kanab, Otah 84741; and to Mrs. Elsie J. Brinkerhoff, Glendale,
Otah 84729,

day of

all by first class mail,

FBfiZUARY

postage fully prepaid this

^___, 1986.
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M E H T^^'^^S^rV //

THIS AGREEMENT, mode and antcrod I n t o by and botw?on ELSIEf SRINXERHGFi
of Glands f e , Coynty of fono, S t a t e o f Utah, PARTY OF THE FIRST PART, h e r e i n a f t e r ro1*rro4

t o as tho "SELLER" and CLOYD H. BZU&iZZOcF and MARS SRIWKERiSfF

of Glandalo, County of tana. S t a t e of Utah, PARTIES OF THE SECOND PART, r,©reltia f t e r r e f o r r o d t o as tho "CUYCRS*,

HilMllil!!5
THAT UHZRSAS, tho SELLER Is the &*mr of 1h* real property', ?.r2zlnr.
.prfvl logos and w t a r rights In tho Statos of Utah and Arizona;
AIO WHEREAS, tho BUYERS das fro to purchase tho

ZCGIQI

AND WHEREAS, the perries havo agrood upon terns and conditions tor thej
sale thereof;
HOt! THEREFORE, In consideration of tho prenlses and of tve ritual
covenants and agreements hereinafter set exit tho parties hereinafter agr&o *lth
and betvocn ono ancthor as follows:
1,

Thot f o r and I n consideration o f tho t o t a l stm of FIFTY THEfc'E

THOUSAND TWEE HUNDRED EIGHTY-EIGHT ($33,325.00) DOLLARS, as tho f u l l considers-]
tJoe t h e r e f o r , tho SELLER covenants and agrees t o eel J and tho-BUYERS covenant
end egroo t o buy tho following described r e a l property, grazing p r l v l ic^cs and
water and r e s e r v o i r f i g h t s I n the States of Utah and Arizona:
REAL PROPERTY Ui MILLARD COtWTY, UTAHt
Lois t , 2 f 3 , snti 4 , Block 25, P l a t "A", Delta Towns!te.
Lot 2 , Block 26, P l a t

n

A», (to I to Tovnslte

REAL PROPERTY IK KANE COUNTY, UTAH:
Township 39 South, Range Ai Kest, S.^lt Lake Marfdlen:
Vest !>alf oi Sf>ctlon 25, containing 320 ecres.
Uoctht-est Quortor* Southeast Ouartcr and tho Sooth Ho if
of iho Northeast Quarter coritr.lning 0 0 ceres, a l l in
Section ?•:-, Tonnsnlp JJ South, Remjs 4 f V>*st, SaJt lako
Meridian, containing 0 0 acres, wore or loss.

"

PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT

l o t * l f 2, 3 , ami i.\ Southo.ist fr.zrtor o* tho Northwest Qyortor; N\y-*f*;t>ort (juartor of tho Southeast
Qvartar; Ccjf H j i f of tho Co'st K u f ; S-*»?tn<ast C a r t e r
oi the florth^jst CSj^rlcr; lior thwort ',«v;jrtor of ti*v?
Southeast C a r t e r oi Tcciion 27, lovmr-Mp 3V South,
Rr.-.ga 4f V.ort, containing ;7S.S;> ccros.

-2Eest Half of the Worthoost Quarter; South Half of the
Southeast Qit.'trtor; Worthiest <>jar*or of tho Southeast
Quarter of Section 3 5 , containing 203 acres.
Township 40 South, Range 4 i West, S a l t Lako HurldlAnt
Section 29: Southwest Quarter of tho Northeast Quarter;
Kost Half of the Southeast Qv-arior and tho Southoast Quarter
of the Southwest Quarter, containing 160 acres.
Section 30: Northwest Quarter; East Hi If of the Southwost
Quarter, containing 233-99 acres.
Section

5: Lot 2, containing 3 - . 3 3 acres.

Tovnshlp 40 South, Range 4 West, So I t take Meridian:
South*oct Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 8,
containing 40 acres.
Township 40 South, Rang© 7 West. S a l t Lai;e Meridian:
Beginning a t tho Southeast Corner of the Southwest Quartor of
tho Southeast Quarter of Section 23, Tovnshla 40 South, Ran'jo
7 ttost. S a l t Lake Meridicn and running thence East 1 0 . 3
chains; thcoco North 8 0 * Vest 6.36 chains; thence West 3.6o
chains; thenco South \ chain t o beginning, containing .74
acres.
Dog Inn Inn a t tho fJorthwest Cornor of tho Korth\yect Quarter o r ^
t h e Northeast Quarter of Section 2 0 , Township 40 South, Hinge
7 V.'ost, and running thoncer Sooth 4.30 chains; thence South 7 0 '
East 15 chains to tho middle of the channel of the creek; thenco
Korthvicctorly ciong tho *ni dd lo of the channel of said crook to
the Worth Lino of sale Horthr;ast Q-uortor of the Northeast
Quarter; thof>co Vest 11.23 chains t o tho place of ooglnnlng.
Doginning 4.30 chains South of the Worthiest Cornor of tho
Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 2C9
Township 40 South, Range 7 l o s t , S a i t Lake Meridian and running thonco South 70* Esst 15 chains to tho .-nlddlo of tho
chanr>oi of the creek; thence Southerly along the middle of
the channel of said creek to tho South Line; t^o.nco fiorth
73*45' f e s t 14,60 chains; thenco North 4.30 chains t o tho
pieco of beginning, containing 5,60 acres.
Th* obevtj throo 1r*ctc being oart of land s i t u a t e d In Sections
23 ond 7t of f.a?d township and ronee, sometimes roforrod to
u n o f f i c i a l l y ac Lot "A".
7c*T,sh!p ^0 South, Ran.j& 4{ V.'ost, S^lt U * e Meridian:
Lot \\ Karthcist Cvartor of the Nor-fhwst C^jrtor of Section
3 1 , cental King 7".30 acres.

^

I
4

•5*
PERSONAL PROPERTY!
*\ The following described voter and reservoir rights:
A one-fourth Interest In Mobblo Canyon Reservoir (9-36-lf)
In Mohave County, Arizona,
A one half Interest In Sullivan Roscrvolr In Mohave County,
Arizona.
And a l l grazing prlvl logos and poralt3 annoxed to or bctsod
upon any of the foregoing r e a l , personal, reservoir, or u-a*ror
rights as cojnensurate.
2.

The parties agree that for and In consideration of the salo by tho

SELLER to the BUYERS of tho foregoing real and personal property, wator ^nd
reservoir rights and grazing prlvl legos, tho RATERS wl II pay to the SELLER i t o
sua of T«VO THOUSAJJD ($2,030.03) DOLLARS, each year, beginning with the 1st day
of Hovenbor, 1964, of *hich payments due on November 1 , 1964 and r2o-<.«n!«cr 1,
1965 <iro hereby acknowledged by the SELLER fro* tho GLTfEnS and the OUTEHS will
continue to pay annual I n^ta I laonts of S2.000.00 on the 1st day of No vaster In
each year thereafter beginning November 1, 1966 and continuing during the entire
l i f e of the SELLER.
The HJYERS ogres that they wi I I pay the sua of 52,000,00 ?or your to
the SELLER for tho ontiro roaaindor of SELLERS II fo Irrespective of tho «aount|
which ©ay be paid undor this contract whether I t exceeds the total consideration
hereinabove sot out or whether that total amount shall not be paid by applying
annua I _gayaents of 32, OX. 00 against the purchase price during the l i f e ti-no of
the SELLER and in consideration of an undertaking by the DUYERS to pay tho
mount of $2,000.00 per year for the l i f e of tho SELLER Irrespective of tho
aacunt which evay be paid, the SELLERjwalvos interest upon the w ^ J A

to*,—os*

I t Is provided, howevor, that should the total consideration hereinabove provldod not bo paid by the emrERS to tho 5ELLER during SELLER'S lifetime!
then upon the death of the SELLER any o-wunts remaining under this Agrccrscnt
after crediting a i l parents which have boon aado horoyndor, shall be paid
annually us prov!<J>d borjln In 9qysi shares, stores end share alike, to

j

-4-

ttarren Brlnherhoff and Charley ArJand Brlnlcorhoff tvo-sovenths (2/7ths>

0/7ths

t o each) of tho bolonces due ( I t being s t i p u l a t e d t h a t the GUYERS together *ltt> |
Varren &-lnkorhof<, Chorloy Arlend B r l n k e r h o f f , Batty B. E s p I I n , Goldo B. Ad3ir,|
and Arlcno B. Gouldlng c o n s t i t u t e a l l the heirs a t law of the SELLER and t h a t

|

other provision has boon cade f o r tho l a t t e r thrco naraed h e i r s ) , together * I t h
I n t e r e s t a t Jour

{£$)

par cont par enrujn on the doferrod declining jvaUinces.

The ELMERS siay, at any tlrao f prepay a l l or any psri

of the regaining

principal duo under t h i s c o n t r a c t .
5.

Tho SELLER shn 11 exocute o v arrant*/ Dood t o the rea I pro^r-ry

hereinabove described srid quitclaim conveyances to the t*atcr ond reservoir
r i g h t s hcrelnafove described, of en undivided one half I n t e r e s t t o ench QUYER
and his v i f e 03 j o i n t tenants with f a l l r i g h t s of survivorship, and s h s l l
deposit said Instruments In tho Hurricane Branch of the Bank of S t . George

|

t&hlch shall hold those docu*»>cnts I n t r u s t ond In escrov subject t o tho following!:
ESCROW IHSTRLCTICfJS
I f the gUYEKS _s>a ILmako a 11 poymonts of principal ond I n t e r e s t herein
provided ond perfona a l l the other covenants and agreements herein contained,
then upon payt?>ent of the f i n a l I n s t a l H o n t due >iereanderj;heEscrow Depository
shall dellvor t o tho &TTEES a l l tho escrowed drjcu-nents.
In the ovent of a d e f a u l t I n the payrnent of any Instatl'scnt of principal!
or I n t e r e s t and In the ov€ir\i of a d e f a u l t I n any other term or condition herein j
end In tho event notice of a d e f a u l t other than for payrront of p r i n c i p a l ond
Interest shall to given t o tho 5JYERS by the SELLER and a oubsec^ont fa! lure

I

to r o * c y the sr.-as t h a l l continue for a period of t h i r t y (305 days, thon the
SELLER cvry, at her option, C<x>'*4 a rt>w-e livery to her of cIS of tho t-zzr-yvdiS
doevsnants vhoreupon the wU/ERS v l l l vacate and po-<cobly surrender n i l o1 tho

j

premises here I nab a ve cfoscribod end the SELLER ~*y ro-enter I r.te poose^'loncf
She $•&*& without f u r t h e r p - x e s s and cray r e t a i n as-rent &nd |» quivered dcrroges
a l l terra ti<-roiOfc-re r^sld by &JY££S uncior t h i s Agreir-ent.

|
i

•5As an alternative rocaedy the SELLER may oloct to reduce^any Payment
or a l l payments, accelerating and oaturing the^entlre balance of pHjjcioaJ and
Interest Immediately, to Judgrcont or nay have said ranedy on one or aore suecosslve cr Intermittent occasions or oay oloct to treat this Agroomont as a
noto and oortgoge passing t i t l e through to the BUYERS ond foreclosing tho SCKO
tn the oanner provided by lav.
Curing the period tho GUYERS ere coa?lying with the terns of this
Agreement, thay shalI ^ . o n t l t j ^ d jho Jhe sole, cxejusl vot_and J>&nof i.cial.jise-*
occupancy, andjanjoypont of tho above described premises subject only to tho
rights of the SELLER to Inspect the sarae at rossonsbie times.
4.

The BUYERS have inspected said preaises and find the suae in 2

aannor satisfactory to thoa and thore are no covenants or warranties orhor
than expressly set forth herein.
5*

Time shall be of the essence as to alt the terms and conditions of

this Agreement vhich shall bind and inure to tho benefit of the heirs, sue*
cessors, and assigns of the parties hereto 6nxi tho party in default agrees to
pay a l l costs and a reasonable attorney's fee in the event enforcement of this
contract is required.
WITNESS the hands of the parties hereto this

/&

day of A ,

,

<SZ
XSUTm

Elsie yuri iikornoft

^yCs
SELLER

,J

Cioyd H. 2r\rMcrhp£Jr

^ /?{£

J^f^f

<r Q^^^^^^^i
^Urx Brinkornoif

/£/
OUTERS

<f'r

^-yd'<Tir?S>'

To whom It noy concern:

VJS S M : — " - " "
^Zi^fl

' gj^jfcJeJ,

Signed:

STATE OF UTAH

/A

) SS.
)

County of Kane
On this (4 h
appeared before me
of the above

, personally

day of (Xb>^t.f

, the signer

Elsie 3rinkerhoff

and foregoing instrument, who duly aekn.>wledsed

to me that she executed the same.

\'<,,h(>. 5 .(l»A*,

_

Notary Public
•

Residing at Jf£u-.xin-<k.

UtT*A.

PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT

M

Reco/dad at Raqueat 0/
•I

—
Counry Rtcordtr

M. FM Pud S

« y _

800k.

OfP.-

M«il tax notice to

Ret.;

Paoa,

.filftndalm. »rah —£,4223L

Addre»

-Grantees

WARRANTY DEED
Elsie Srinkerhoff, a widow,
of*

GJendale

CONVEY

of

Kane

, County 0/

and WARRANT

Glendale, Utah

grantor

to

(

Statt of Utah, hereby

ELSIE 8RINKERH0FF, a widow, MARK J . 8RINKERH0FF, a
married man, and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, a married man,
a l l as Joint Tenants with f u l l rights of survivorship,
and not as Tenants in Common,
ti
a/antac;
for tht aim of
—-00LLAM,
County,

84729

S10.00 & other valuable considerationUM foJJowinf described trice of land in
KANE
Staff of Utah:

J

ill
8.4

SEE SCHEDULE "A" ATTACHED HERETO ArtO 3Y THfS REFERENCE MADE A PART HEREOF.

2 3 3

I

Ql

I rJ

WITNESS, tha hand

of said grantor

, this

4 th

dey 0/

* \% r
June

A. 0. 19 7 9 .

Signed in the Pntence of
Elsie 8rinkerhoff

STATE OF UTAH
County of

)

Kane
On trie

SS.

4th

ippeireri before ma

the signer
to me that

^

day of

June

Elsie 8rinkerhoff,

A. 0., 19 79

personally

a widow,

of the within instrument who duly acknowledged
S he
executed the same.

-..^->^..^,4^il
James 8. Adair

My Commi»on expires —June

Notary Public

19 *.A319.
My residence is.. --^StiSS^JU^a^JJ^L
UlVtUai M i a M i l --- . .. a • .. _
^
uvrncMtfAM rrru et«r«af.#.# taiim m w

/K7

DEFENDANTS
EXHIBIT

^

SCHEDULE "A"
PARCEL 1: .The West half of Section 25. Townshio 39 South, Ranqe 4S West,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, contalninq 320.0 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 2: Tne Northwest Ouarter (NWS); the Southeast Ouarter (SES) and the
South Half of the Northeast Ouarter (Sl/lEv«) of Section 26. Townshio 39 South,
Ranoe *s West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing 400.0 acres, rare or less.
PARCEL 3: Lots 1 , 2, 3, and 4; the Southeast Ouarter of the Northwest Ouarter
(5EV<VS); the Northeast Ouarter of the Southwest Ouarter (NESSWH); the East Half
of the East Half (ESES); the Southwest Ouarter of the Northeast Ouarter (SWVlES)
and the Northwest" Ouarter of the Southeast Ouarter (NWHSES) of Section 27,
Townshio 39 South, Range 4S West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing 478.80
acres, more or less.
PARCEL 4: The East Half of the Northeast Quarter (EV<ES); the South Half of
the Southeast Ouarter (SSSES) and Northwest Ouarter of the Southeast Ouarter
(NWHSEk) of Section 35, Townshio 39 South, Ranoe 4S West. Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, containing 200.0 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 5^ The Southwest Ouarter of the Northeast Ouarter (SWSNES); the West
Half of the Southeast Ouarter (WSSES) and the Southeast Quarter of the Southwest
Ouarter (SESSWS) of Section 29, Townshio 40 South, Ranqe 4S West, Salt Lake 8ase
it\d Meridian, containing 160.0 acres, more or less.
PARCEL' 6: The Northwest Ouarter (NVSj and the East Half of the Southwest
Ouarter of Section 30, Townshio 40 South, Ranne 4S West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, containinn 238.99 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 7: Lot 2, Section S, Townshio 40 South, Range 4^ West, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian, containina 39.08 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 8: Tne Southwest Ouarter of the Northwest Ouarter (SW4NVH) of Section
8 , Townshio 40 South, Ranoe 4 West, Salt Lake Base and .Meridian, containing
40.0 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 9: Lot 1 and the Northeast Ouarter of tne Northwest Ouarter (NESNWS)
of Section 3 1 , Townshio 40 South, Ranoe 4^ West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
contalninq 79.30 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 10: BEGINNING at the North Quarter Corner of Section.26, Township 40
South, Range 7 West, S a l t Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South
0*35' West S67.60 f e e t ; thence South 78°00' East 963.6 f e e t ; thence Northwesterly along the creek bed, 808.0 f e e t , more or l e s s , to the North l i n e of
Section 26; thence South 09*57' West 741.18 feet to the point of beginning.
Containing 11.77 acres, more or less,
PARCEL 11: BEGINNING at the Southwest Comer of the Southwest Quarter of
the Southeast Quarter of Section 23, Township 40 South, R a n g e d West, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence East 10.23 chains; thence North
80* West 6.36 chains; thence West 3.68 chains; thence South L.O chain to the
point of beginning. Containing 0.74 acres, more or less.
••
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BY

.
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.-• County Recorder

M. Fit Paid S -
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Rage

Book
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Address

Mail tai notice to

W A R R A N T Y DEED
Elsie Brinkerhoff, a widow,

grantor

of Slendale

Kane

county of

State of Utah, hereby

CONVEY and WARRANT to * 60LDA B. ADAIR, a married woman, as to an undivided 1/5
interest;
WARREN
BRINKERHOFF, a m a r r i e d man, as to an u n d i v i d e d 1/5 I n t e r e s t ; A RUNE B. GOULD ING,
a m a r r i e d woman, as t o an u n d i v i d e d 1 / 5 I n t e r e s t ; CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF, a
m a r r i e d man, as t o a n u n d i v i d e d 1/5 I n t e r e s t and BETTY B. ESPLIN, a m a r r i e d
woman, as to an undivided 1/5 Interest,
oranttes
of Orderville, Utah
for the asm
$10.00 l other valuable consideration
-DOLLARS, m

s!

the following described tract of land in
State of Utah:

County,
r«.«*»

KANE

•

SEE SCHEDULE MA" ATTACHED HERETO ANQ BY THIS REFERENCE MAOE A PART HEREOF:

»**

»

i

WITNESS, the hand

of s»d frantor

. this

15th

day of

August

A. 0. 19 8 0 .

^..ZL,*,^^^

Signed in the Presence of

Elsie Brinkerhoff

STATE OF UTAH
County of

*J

)
) SS.

Kane

J
On the

15th

day of

appeared before me

the signer
to me that

August

A. 0.. 13 80

personally

E l s i e B r i n k e r h o f f , a widow,

of the within insmiment who duly acknowledged
She
executed the same.
* James B. Adair

My Commiulon tspirts-~.Jui»t. W.«-J583....

—

My residence h

3SY

Notary Public
0r.d.emJ.]*.^JU.t«A

r^

n

DEFENDANTS
EXHIBIT
(o

PAD_C_CL~ }: The W-^t ; >alf of Section : L <, V - . i : rr.c jJ South, Range 4'; West,
SaVt L^e Base and Meridian, co'-taininc: v* . ; •••r-«.-*J% rore or less.
PA.PC.-J-. j?L The Northwest n L artcr (NWh;; :*•' ^.uineust n u a r t e r (SE\«) and the
Sbuth~*HaTf of tne Northeast o 0 a~ter (SVl-.'J of A c t i o n ?6, Townshio 39 South,
Ranoe 4;* West, Salt L*ke Base and Meridian, i.ontaininq 400.0 acres, more or less
PARCEL. 3: Lots 1 , 2 , 3, and 4; the Southear. b a r t e r of tlie northwest Quarter
TS^NWvS;" the Northeast Quarter of the Soulhw,M b a r t e r (NEV»SWVi); the East Hall
of the East Half [VA\)\
the Southwpst fh.*rtt.-r of the Northeast Quarter (SWy*E!«]
and the Northwest b a r t e r of the Soutneabt b a r t e r (NW*SE*«) of Section 27,
Townshio 39 South, Panqe 4v3 West, Salt Lake Eave and Meridian, containing 478.8C
a c r e s , nore or less.
PARCEL 4: The East Half of the Northeast Q;.«»rvr (E ! ,NE\i); the South Half of
the Southeast Quarter (SSSE^) and Northwest n.. rtr :er of the Southeast Quarter
(NWaSE\i) of Section 35, Townshio 39 South, *an'»c 4^ West, Salt Lake Base and
M e r i d i a n , containing 200.0 acre r >, more or less.
PARCEJ. 5j_ The Southwest Quarter of the Nor:n<?ast Quarter (SVyiE*); the West
H a l T o T the Southeast Quarter (w'-SEL) and the Southeast Quarter of the Southwesl
Quarter (SE^SW^) of Section 29, Townshio 40 South, Ranqe 4S West, Salt Late Bas<
and Meridian, containing 160.0 acres, more or less.
P

A R 2LLA : . T h c Northwest Quarter (NW:«) and :.nc Last Half of the Southwest
Quarter" of Section 30, Townshio 40 South, t'lnn** V2 West, Salt Lake Base and
M e r i d i a n , containinr, 238.99 acres, more or le^s.
PARCEL 7: Lot 2 , Section 5, Townshio 40 South, Ranrje 4S West, Salt Lake Base
and M e r i d i a n , containina 39.OR acres, more o» t^ss.
PARCEJL 3:* .The Southwest Quarter of the NorthM*stJ'jarter (SWVNW>4) of Section
ET TcwosTnn*f40 South, Ranoe 4 West, Salt '/»(• Rase and Meridian, containing
4O.0 acres, more or less.
PARCCJL 9: Lot 1 anri the Northeast ' b a r t e r of -• t»- horr.hwest O u arter {NEVNW1*)
of ScV.Ton 3 1 , Townsniii 40 South, Ranoe 4\. We. 4 , Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
containino 79.30 acres* wore or less.
PARCEL 10: BEGINNING at the North Quarter Corner of Section 26, Township 40
South', Range 7 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South
0 4 '35' West S67.60 f e e t ; thence South 78°00' Fast 963.6 f e e t ; thence Northwesterly along the creek bed, S03.0 f e e t , more or l e s s , to the North l i n e of
Section 26; thence South 89°57' West 741.18 f e e t to the point of beginning.
Containing 11.77 acres, more or lessPW?CJL.Jii 3EGINNING at the Southwest Corner of the Southwest Quarter of
the Southeast Quarter of Section 23, Township 40 South, Range 7 West, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence Fast 10.23 chains; thence North
8 0 ' West 6.36 chains; thence West 3.68 chains; thence South 1.0 chain to the
point of beginning. Containing 0.74 acres, more or l e s s .
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O^^Ll^U- HA.7., Z- Z. Ac .rl
Elsie Brinkerhoff

. ^Ij
j£/

LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF
* * * * * * * * * * * * *

*

I, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF being an actual bona fide resident
of Glendale, County of Kane, State of Ucah, being of sound and
disposing mind and memory, knowing the objects of my bounty and
not acting under any menace, fraud or undue influence, do hereby
and by these presents make, publish and declare chis instrument
as and to be my Last Will and Testament, hereby revoking any and
all former Wills and Codicils thereto made by me at any time.
FIRST
I nominate Betty Esplin, Orderville, Utah., my daughter
to act as Personal Representative of chis Will co serve without
bond.
SECOND
I direct that my Personal Representative as soon after
my demise as is practicable, co pay all my lawfully enforceable
debts and all expenses of my last illness, funeral, and burial.
THIRD
I direct that my estate shall be distributed in seven
(7) equal shares, one share co be distributed co each of my six
children and one share to my daughter-in-law, Lena Brinkerhoff.'
My children are:

Mark Brinkerhoff, Glendale, Utah;

Golda Adair, Orderville, Utah; Warren Brinkerhoff, St. George,
Utah;

Arlene

Orderville,

Golding,
Utah;

daughter-in-law

Glendale,

Betty

Utah;

Esplin,

Charles

Orderville,

Brinkerhoff,
Utah

and

my

is Lena Brinkerhoff, surviving wife of Cloyd

Brinkerhoff deceased.
I

direct

that

in

any

event

that

any

one

of the

foregoing shall predecease me than the share that Chey would have
taken

shall

go

to

their

lineal

descendants

by

right

of

representation per stirpes, and not per capica.

DEFENDANTS
EXHIBIT

/3

FOURTH

j

I also represent that I may at so tut; time in the future !
prepare a written

list of

items of personal

use, ornament, or

effect which may dispose of items of a personal nature but will |
not

include

real

estate,

securities,

money

deposits

or !

receivables but will only dispose oi items of personal property |
exclusive of the enumerated exceptions foregoing.
if

such

a

list

is prepared

by

me

dated

ana

I direct tha.t

signed

articles of personal property which are thus disposed
distributed

to the

recipienr

without

any

further

than

the

shall be j

direction

or j

proceeding.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF 1 have r.u-.di . published and declared j
this instrument as and to be my Last Will ar.u 'les tar::ent in the j
presence

of

^^

Phvilis C. Espiin

Cecelia H> Chamberlain , \

attesting witnesses, who witness and attest the same in my sight j
and in my presence at
April

Orderville

, Utah, this

23rd

day of j

, 1982.

Elsie Drinkerholi
On

this'

23rd

day

of

April

foregoing instrument, consisting of TWO (1)

198 2,

the i

pages:, including this ,

page, was in the presence of us, and each of us, made, signed, ,
published and declared
and

to be her Last

presence
attesting

of

each

by the TESTATRIX, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, as

Will

and Testament, who

other,

witnesses,

which

do

hereby

said

Last

in

subscribed
Will

executed by the TESTATRIX ELSIE BRINKERHOFF

and

the
our

sight
names

T-estament

;

and |
as |
was

in our sight and in

o-ur presence and declared by said TESTATRIX ELSIE BRINKERHOFF to
be her Last Will and Testament, she requesting
subscribing witnesses and we. and each ot

chat we act as j

us, do hereby certify

and declare that in our opinion che TESTATRIX

:

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF j

~ 3 is of sound and disposing mind and memory and not acting under
any menace, fraud, or undue influence.

Address:

Address:

I, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, the TESTATRIX, sign my name to
this instrument this

23rd

day of

April

, 1982 , and being

first duly sworn, do hereby declare to Che undersigned authority
that

I sign

and

execute

this

instrument .as my

Last Will

and I

Testament and I sign it willingly; that I execute it as my free j
and voluntary act for the purposes therein expressed and that I j
am eighteen years of age or older, of sound mind, and under no !
constraint or undue influence.
i
i

I
I
£lsie Brinkerhoff

\

, V

i
WE,

P h y l l i s C. E s p l i n

and

C e c e l i a H. Chamberlain ,

the

witnesses, sign our names to t h i s instrument, being f i r s t

duly
i

sworn, and do hereby declare
the

TESTATRIX

instrument
willingly

as

ELSIE
her

Last

to the undersigned authority

BRINKERHOFF
Will

and each of us, in

and

signs
Testament

the presence

and
and

executes
she

that j
this |

signs

and hearing

it I

of the

TESTATRIX ELSIE BRINKERHOFF and of each other, hereby sign this '
Will

as witnesses

to the TESTATRIX'S

signing, and that to the

best of our knowledge the TESTATRIX ELSIE BRINKERHOFF is eighteen

years of age or older, of sound mind, and under nc constraint or j
undue influence.

ji

STATE OF UTAH

l|
i!
I;

COUNTY OF Smim

II
ii

ELSIE

j

)
Kane

)

Subscribed,

Defore

BRINKERHOFF,
me

by

ii
!
,

witnesses,

ji

Residing At:

this

the

ss .

sworn

co

and

TESTATRIX,

acknowledged
ana

Phyllis C. Ssplin
23rd

day of

and
April

Notarv

GE

N

u a m? *z:'
o2<i

z<*Z
k.X : 3

•aou 5 .

*n°°

*<H
5 5
(A

O r d e r v i l l e . Utah

My Commission E x p i r e s :

z
<

X

subscribed

May 7, 1985

before
and

me

by

sworn

co

Cecelia H. Chamberlain ,
, 1 *^8 2.

Public

BISHOP & RONNOW, P.C.
Willard R. Bishop
Attorney for Plaintiff
P. 0. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-9483
IN THB SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP KANE COUNTY,
STATB OP UTAH
MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal
Representative of the Estate
of CLOYJ) H. BRINKERHOPF,
LENA BRINKERHOFF, and MARK J.
BRINKERHOPF,
Plaintiff,

STIPULATION

vs.
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B.
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF,
ARLENE B. GOULDING, and JOHN
DOES I through V,

Civil No. 1826

Defendants.
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, Defendant in the above-entitled action,
agrees and stipulates as follows:
1.

That

the

certain

agreement

dated

October

26, 1966

(hereinafter "Agreement" attached as Exhibit " A " ) , executed by
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, Seller, and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF and MARK J.
BRINKERHOFF, Buyers, together with any other agreement containing
substantially the same terms, is a valid and binding contract
which she executed without coercion, and with full knowledge and
understanding of its provisions and duties.
2.
and

That she agrees to conform to the terms of the Agreement,

perform

all

conditions

and

duties

provided

and

imposed

thereunder, including specific performance on her part.

PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT

40

3.

That she recognizes she improperly attempted to convey

land to others contrary to the terms of the Agreement, and hereby
repudiates a certain Warranty Deed dated June 4, 1979, (Exhibit
"B")

purporting

to

convey

to

ELSIE

BRINKERHOFF,

MARK

J.

BRINKERHOFF, and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, as Joint Tenants, the same
property conveyed under the Agreement, and further repudiates any
other deeds or instruments of conveyance which have the effect of
divesting

or

in

any

way

diminishing

the

right,

title, and

interest of buyers and their wives, in the property specified in
the Agreement.
4.

That she acknowledges the receipt of $2,000 from the

Buyers, and/or

their heirs, HARK J. BRINKERHOFF

and LENA A.

BRINKERHOFF, for the 1983 payment pursuant to the terms of the
Agreement.
5.

That she forgives and waives all rights to any and all

delinquent amounts currently due under the Agreement.
6.

That she recognizes the validity of a certain affidavit

dated April 13, 1971, (attached as Exhibit "C") , and reaffirms
the statements contained therein and further agrees to cooperate
and assist Plaintiffs in the litigation of their claims against
other named Defendants in the above-entitled action.
7.

That her Amended Counterclaim against the Plaintiffs and

her Crossclaim

against MARK

J. BRINKERHOFF,

as filed

in this

action, shall be dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits.
8.

That

the

Court

performance against her.

shall

enter

a

decree

of

specific

?:

( .
In

consideration

for

the

Stipulation

specified

above,

Plaintiffs hereby stipulate as follows:
\.

Plaintiffs will not seek any award of damages against

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF under their Second Amended Complaint.
2.

Plaintiffs will reimburse Defendants, GOLDA B. ADAIR,

WARREN BRINKERHOFF, and ARLENE B. GODLDING for the amounts paid
to ELSIE BRINKERHOFF

for the purported

transfer of properties

specified under the Warranty Deed dated June 4, 1979, Exhibit
"B-, in return for the said Defendants1

Agreement to drop all

their claims filed in the above-entitled lawsuit and dismiss the
same with prejudice.

If said Defendants do not dismiss said

claims before 20 September 1984, Plaintiffs shall be under no
obligation of reimbursement.
3.
judgment

That the above-entitled Court may enter its Order and
in conformance with

this Stipulation

and Plaintiff's

prayer for relief as specified in their Second Amended Complaint.
DATED this

O^-

day of September, 1984.

i?Jk<L^ j i i / ^ w
ELSIE BRJSKERHOFF
STATE OF OTAH
^^

County of

7
day
f>3A

On the
appeared

)
:ss.
)
of

/

/

v^^^-fC^S2~L\
v*S>uL.
A.

, 1984, personally

before roe ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, Defendant
t

-3-

/V

named

in the

above-entitled

action,

the

signer

of the above and

foregoing

instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that she executed the
same.

m g at: /

^TCta^f

DATED this

[UTL*-

day-.of Sept

WILLARD R. BISHOP v
Attorney for Plaintiff/
STATE OF UTAfl
ss.
County of

)

On the
appeared

/0zA

day of

\SjLtih#7^LuAs

before me WILLARD

, 1 984, personally

R. BISHOP, attorney

for Plaintiff

ANDERSON in the above-entitled action, the signer of the above
and foregoing

instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he

executed the same.
/)

'-tfOTARY
ri. e*-. s»si-»•dy-k.
i nAg* w at*t w; •
/ x r^k\ x PUBLIC,
tvuu-L'w,

C&dtAfiy,/ //J
My Commission e x p i r e s :

^P ijJMsftJ P7

P/ZJQ

j

.

C

Vr

:•;

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true and correct copy
of

the

above

and

foregoing

STIPULATION

to

Mr.

Hans

Q.

Chamberlain, CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE, Attorneys at Law, 110 North
Main Street, Suite G, Cedar City, Utah 84720, by first class
mail, postage fully prepaid this
1984.

day of

,

c^
»*. » .5 e ,*.

^

*? ,"•-;•/; j , ^ -

A 6 R C E M C H T

T1<!S K&£ZHZm,

^

(

\

w

* o d * and ontcrod I n t o by and bot^coo EISIC ^IMXIRHCrrJ

of Glondolo, Covnty of fono, S t a t e of Utah, PARTY OF TIC FIRST PART, h o r c l n a f t e r roforrod t o as tho "SELLER" and CLOTD H. GRW.'CS-OFF and MAHS inj:i)CRi&"F
of Glondalo, County of fcino. State of Utah, PARTIES OF THZ SECOfO P-ST,

r*reln-

a f t o r r e f o r r o d t o as tho "UTTCRS",

KjBT]l£2i£Iii:
THAT W>ERSA5# tho SritCR I s the ©wicr of tho res I property,
p r i v i l e g e s ond water r i g h t s Ir. tho S l a l c s of Utah end

^rnrinr

\r\zor^;

AJO VKCREAS, tho QJYERS dssiro t o p-jrcLaso tho s^rte;
AIO YrHEREAS, tho p c r t l e * hevo agreed upon tcr^s ond condi 1! *ns i s r th,
sale tl>orcof;
KCW TJCRCFCr^!, In consideration of tho D.-cnlscs zr\6 of t.-e T,-;?U2I
covor.o-.ts and agnxnenvo h e r e i n a f t e r set a i t the pnrtler. h e r e i n a f t e r Licrco * I T ; I
and bct»ocn ono another as follows:
t«

Thot for ond I n ccnsicerotlon of the t o t o l su*n of FIFTY

"}&Z

T.ICUSAiO TWEE HUCftED EIGHTY-EIGHT (*53,3eS,0D> DOLLARS, as t:^o f u l l

consider::-!
i
t l o n t h o r o f o r , tho SELLER covenants cr\4 agrees to c e i l and tho BUYERS covenant

end egroo t o buy tho f o l l o v i n g doscribed rool property, grsztng privilege? ^nc
voter ond r e s e r v o i r r i g h t s In tho Ststoo of Utah znd Arizona:
REAL PROPERTY lit MILLARD COUTHY, UTAHt
Lois 1 , 2, 3 , and 4 , Clock 25, P l a t "A", Delta Tawnclt*.
l o t 2 , Block 26, P l o t "A", Dalta T o w e l to
HEAL PROPERTY IN ICVJC CXWTY, UTAH:
Township 19 Ssuth, Ron go 4{ Kost, Sslt L;:!:o IVcrldior.;
Vest IJolf oi Section 2!?, containing 320 acres.
Ifcxiht-cst Cw'-jr^or; Sojthesst g a r t e r ond the South K J H
0< 1">J Lrrl'.^DST o . ! 3 ^ c r c r r s t r l nlr.g 0 3 s * r c : , a l l In
S e c t i o n : v ; , ToKnr.Mp ;„•,' S j u t n , R«i«-w9 4 f V.*st, S a l t toko
Mr.rl c l a n , c o n j o i n i n g 0 3 a c r c r , t o ' e or l o s s .
l o t * I , ?, 3, zr\d /.; S>jt!-.o.TSt C A ^ r t u r o» tho Jir.rthvest \ u - : r t n r ; »;>"ti.^.ict I v i n r t c r o i t n c S->jtn-..esT
s v a r l u r ; U o t MJ If of I'-.o Cc-i' K ; ; f ; $.^..*!»ifcs? u u r t c r
O^ ^ c ! . . . . - < - ^ ^ t ^ - U - r ; ;;-rrrrv.crt ' / . j r o r of t ; ^
SJ-.I*'-.: c l '\\-„r~.er o{ r i 11 • o*> r.', ^r-^»-:"-M-• i > r o o l r . ,
lt-.--p ^ i V v . t , c o n : r i : i n c -7C-.0D c c r o s .

iT V ' j r 0 7 y

t A

"li5li

M*!i

A

I

.—

I -.

T O b<U»W,+

4D

-2East Half of the Northoast Quarter; South « a l f of the
Southeast (H^'rtor; Nort Inmost Charter of the Southeast
Quarter of Section 3 5 , containing 203 a c r e s .
Township 40 South, Range 41 West, S o l t Lako Meridian:
Section 70i Southvost Quarter of tho Northeast Quarter;
Kost Halt of the Southeast Charter and tho Southeast Quarter
of the Southwest Quortcr, containing 160 acres.
Section 3 0 : Northwost Quarter; East Itelf of tho Southwest
Quartor, containing 233.59 acres.
Section

5: l o t 2 , containing 3 - . 03 acres.

Township 40 South, Range 4 b e s t . S a l t Lake Meridian:
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 8 f
containing 40 c e r e s .
Township 40 South, Range 7 West. S a l t Laiie Meridian:
Dog!fining a t tho Southvost Cornor of the Southwest Quartor of
tho Southeast Quartor of Section 23, Township 40 South, Ranro
7 ttost, S a l t take Moridlen and running thonce East 10,23
chains; thonco North 6 0 * V.'ost 6.36 chains; thence Wost 3.6o
chains; thense Sooth 1 chain t o beginning, containing .74
acres.
Beginning a t the Northwest Cornor of tho Northwest Quarter o t N
the Northeast Quartor of Section 2 6 , Township 40 South, Ringo
7 Best, and running thence South 4 , 3 0 chains; thence South 70*
East 15 chains t o tho middle of the channel of the creek; thonco
North*estorly along the mlddlo of the channel of sold creek t o
the North Lino of said NorthKOSt Quartor of tho northeast
Quarter; thonco West 11.23 chains t o tho place of beginning.
Doglnnlrg 4.30 chains South of the Northwest Corner of the
Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quartor of Section 2CP
Township 40 South, flange 7 k o s t , S a l t Lako World!en and running thonco South 7 0 * East 15 chains to tho middle of tho
channol of the creek; thonco Southerly along tho middle of
the channel of said creek to tho South L i n e ; thonco North
73*45' Kcst 14.CO chains; thonco North 4.30 chains t o tho
place of beginning, containing 5,60 a c r e s .
The above throe t r a c t s being part of land s i t u a t e d In Sactlons
23 ond 2t of said township and range, souetlcacs roiorrod
to
u n o f f i c i a l l y as Lot "A".
Township 40 South, Bono* 4$ Kost, S a l t Lake Moridlen:
Lot 1 ; N a r t V n s t Quartor of tho Northwest Cuortor of Section
31 # containing 73.30 acres.

-3PERSCKAL PR0PCR77!
N

\

The following described voter and reservoir r i g h t s :
A one-fourth I n t o r e s t In Hobblo Canyon Reservoir
In Monovo County, Arizona,
A on* half
Arizona.

(9-26-1D

I n t e r e s t In S u l l l v j n Rcoorvolr In f-tohovo County,

And a l l grazing p r l v l 10305 anC porolt^ annoyed t o or b-'sod
open any of the vorogoing r c o l , personal, r e s e r v o i r , or u^cor
r i g h t s 05 co.t>on£urcto.
2.

The parties sgree t h c t for and In cons!doration of the LO\O by tho

SELLER to the OTTERS of tho foregoing real and personal property, -..-;, t o r ^nd
reccrvolr r i g h t s and grazing p r i v l l o g o s , tho BUYERS wl I I pay to tno SELLER tho
SU3 of TWO TOOJSA^D ( $ 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) DOLLARS, coch yosr, beginning v i l l i live l e t c'jy
of Hovtnoor, 1964, of *hich paytnonts duo on fJovc-nbor 1 , 1964 *r\d UD.<G-n}.*cr 1 ,
r;C5 aro hereby acknowledged by tho SELLER Inn

tho BUYERS and the KSfZCS * i u

continue t o pay annual Installments of $2,000.00 on tho 1st doy of Xz,\en'jcr

In

each year t h e r e a f t e r beginning Novc^bor 1 , 1966 &f\4 continuing during the c n t i r ^

IIfo of tho SELLER*
The OUTERS ogros H>ot they n i l I pay the sum of 52,000,00 per yo:>r t o
tho SELLER for tho e n t i r e rooalnoor of SELLER'S l i f e i r r e s p e c t i v e of the «*nount
nhlch ©ay be paid undor t h i s contract whether I t exceeds the t o t a l

consideration

hereinabove sot out or vhethor tliat t o t a l amount shotl not be paid by applying
annual p a r e n t s of 5 2 , O X . 0 0 against the purcSaco p r i c * d j r l n g the l i f e ti-no of
the SELLER and In cone!derotion of on undertaking by the OLYERS t o py; tho

i

J

j
asvount of $2,000.00 por year for the I f f e of tho SELLER I r res p o e t i c of tho

!
03Dunt which r*sy be psld, t)"S SELLER w i v e s Intorost upon t ! * unsold Lo!:rw-es. ;
1

It

I t provided, h^»^vor, that S'-Ould tho t s t i f

cc»r.$i ooratlon heroin-

ctov-e provided ftot be paid by tr»o BJfLFS to tho SELLER during SELLER'S

!

Nfcfi.-aoi
1

tSsn uf->on tt*e 605th of the SELLER cr.y amounts rerr-iinir^ ur>^ar t r . I : A ~recrr.cn Ja f t e r c r e d i t i n g a i l ;»5,->^r.tt *hlch r-o.-c S > » r^d-o S c r > . ^ ^ r ,
&n-.vA!!y c» prcv!-J>d v>o,~v!n I r. >^.*f

wall

t-v ;-2ld

r - ^ r e s , c'orcr ft<*»^ i^ors c.Mko, to

j

f. •

ttarren

-c

Brlnkorhoff and Charley Arlend Brlnkorhoff two-sovenths ( 2 / 7 t h s )

tl/7ths

t o each) of tho balances Co* ( I t bolng s t i p u l a t e d t t o t the OUTERS together with
ttarron

DWnkerhoff, Charloy Arlond Brlnkorhoff, Batty 0 . E s p l l n , Golda B. Adair # |

and Arlono B. Gouldlng c o n s t i t u t e a l t the holrs a t law of the SELLER and t h a t
other provision has been code f o r the l a t t o r thrco narood h o l r s ) , together k i t ;
I n t e r e s t a t four (4J?) por cont per annua on the deferred declining balances.
The BUYERS soy, a t any t l o o , prepay a l l or any part of tho regaining
p r i n c i p a l duo undor t h i s c o n t r a c t ,
3.

The SELLER s h a l l execute a Warranty Deed t o the r e a l property

hereinabove described and quitclaim conveyances to the water and rcsorvolr
r i g h t s hcrelnefove described, of en undivided one h a l f I n t e r e s t t o ooch BUYER
and his wife as J o i n t tenants with f u l l r i g h t s of survivorship, and s h a l l
deposit said instruments I n tho Hurricane Branch of the Bonk of S t . George
which shall hold those doctroonts I n t r u s t and In escrow-subjoct t o the folloUnnj
ESCROW IHSmCTlOHS
I f the BUYERS s h a l l sake a l l payments of p r i n c i p a l and Intorost herein
provided and perform a l t the offtor covenants and agreements heroin contained,
then upon payment of the f i n a l Installment due hereunder t h e Escrow Depository
s h a l l d e l l v o r t o the BUYERS a l l the escrowed documents.
In the ovent of a d e f a u l t In the payment of any Installment of prlncipol|
or Intorost and In. the c\tmt

of a d e f a u l t I n any other term or condition heroin

end In tho event notice of a d e f a u l t other than f o r payrnont of principal and
I n t e r e s t shall be g!von t o tho BUYERS by the SELLER and a subsequent fai lure
to remedy tho $*rae shall contlnuo for a period of t h i r t y (30) days, tho* the
SELLER oay# a t her option, demand a r e d e l i v e r y to her of e l l of the oscrtrred
documents vhoreupon the OUTERS w i l l vacate and peaceably surrender o i l of the
premises hereinabove described and the SELLER »3y r e - e n t e r Into possess I on ct
tho tone without f u r t h e r process and «ay r e t a i n aa rent and l\ qui dated denvogos
a l l Kirns tJorotofore pcid by BUYERS undor t h i c Agroenont.

•sAs an a l t e r n a t i v e rmedy the SELLER asy o l c c t t o roduco any payment
or a l l payments, accelerating and oaturlng the o n t l r e balance of prlncloal and
I n t e r e s t JnraedJatoly, t o juCVrvoot or nay hovo said rcrrody on ono or core successive or I n t e r m i t t e n t occasions or ojy e l e c t t o t r o a t t h i s Agroorrjent as a
note ond oort^ago passing t l t l o through to the BJf&RS ond -foreclosing tho sc/io
I n the sinner provided by l a * .
Curing the parlod tito BUYERS are complying with tho terrns of t.Ms
Agreement, they shall bo e n t i t l e d t o the s o l e , e x c l u s i v e , and bonoflcial use,
occupancy, *nd onjoyoent of tho above descrlbod pnwlses subject only to tho
r i g h t s of the SELLER t o Inspect tho sarso a t
4.

rarson^le

times.

The BUYERS have Inspected said pretalsos and f i n d the s**ac in a

aannor s a t i s f a c t o r y t o thea and thore are no covenants or warranties orhvr
than expressly set f o r t h h e r o i n .
5.

Time s h a l l bo of the essence as t o a l l the terms ond conditions of

t h i s Agreement which s h a l l bind end Inure t o tho boneflt of tho h e i r s , successors, and assigns of the parties hereto and the party In d e f a u l t agrees t o
pay a l l costs and a reasonable a t t o r n e y ' s foo In the ov«nt enforcement of t h i s
contract I s r e h i r e d .
Vf|77£SS the hands of the parties hereto t h i s
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Cioyd H. Drlr.iicrroO
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SCHEDULE "A*
PAPCEL 1: The west naif of Sectior 2$, To*nshio 39 South. Rer.ce 4- nest.
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, contammq 3?0.0 acres, rore or less
PAECEL 2: The Northwest Ogarter (MW\); the Southeast O w *rter (SE*.! a^d the
South Half of the Northeast b a r t e r (SViE1.} cf Section 26. TcwnsMc 39 South.
Ranot 4S west. Salt Lake Base and Meridian, cor.taminq 400.C acres, nyrt or l e s s .
^ARCEl 3: tots I . 2, 3, and 4; the Southeast Ouarter of the Northwest Quarter
[SEV<A); the Northeast Quarter of the Southwest b a r t e r (NE^SA); the East Half
of the East Half (ESESh the Southwest b a r t e r of the Northeast Ouarter (SANS*)
it%4 the Northwest Ogarter of the Southeast O u a r t c (NASEH) of Section 27,
Townshio 39 South, Range 4S West. Salt Lake Base md p r i d i a n , containing 478.80
acres. «ore or less.
PARCEL 4: The East Half of the Northeast Quarter (ESN£i|); the South Half of
i n * Southeast b a r t e r (SSSE^) and Northwest firmer of the Southeast Ogarter
(NASE\) of Section 35. Townshio 39 South, Ranoe 4^ West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, containing 200.0 acres. «ore or less.
PARCEL 5. The Southwest b a r t e r of the Northeast Ogarter (SW'WEH); the West
Half of the Southeast Ouarter (ASE**) ind the Southeast Ogarter of the Southwest
b a r t e r (SE*iSW'\) of Section 29. Townshio 40 South. Ranqe 4S West, Salt lane Base
and p r i d i a n , containing 160.Q * c r e s , more or less.
PARCEL 6: The Northwest Ogarter ( N A ) and the East H a l / of the Southwest
Ogarter of Section 30, Townshio 40 South, Ranne t\ West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, containinn 238.99 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 7: lot 2. Section S, Townshio 40 South, 3ange 4w west, Salt Lake Base
and p r i d i a n , containinc 39.08 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 8: Tne Soutr.w^st Ogarter of the Northwest Ogarter ( S A N A ) of Section
8 . Townshio 4C South, Ranoe 4 West, Salt Lake Ease and .Meridian, containing
40.0 acres, <nore or less.
PARCEL 9: tot I and the Northeast Ogarter of tne Northwest Ogarter !NEV<A)
of Section 3 1 , Tcwnshin 40 South, Ranoe 4*, West. Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
containinq 79.30 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 10: BEGINNING at the North Quarter Comer of Section 26, Township 40
South, Range 7 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South
0*35' West 567.60 f e e t ; thence South 78°00* East 963.6 f e e t ; thence Northwesterly along the creek bed, 808.0 f e e t , more or l e s s , to the North l i n e of
Section 26; thence South 09*57* West 741.18 feet to the point of beginning.
Containing 11.77 acres, more or less.
PARCEL I I : BEGINNING at the Southwest Corner of the Southwest Quarter of
the Southeast Quarter of Section 23, Township 40 South, R a n g e d West, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence East 10.23 chains; thence North
30* West 6.36 chains; thence West 3.68 chains; thence South L.C chain to the
point of beginning. Containing 0.74 acres, more or less.
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W A R R A N T Y DEED
Elsie E n ^ e r r o f f .
o<

Glenca", e

CONVEY

of

a widow,

gr-intor
. Counr> of

v * WARRANT

Glendale, L'tan

to

Kar.e

. Stan of 'Jti\ Kinby

ELSIE BRINKERHQFF, a wicow, MARK J . BRi.NKEP.HCFF, a
marHed nan, ir\d ClQYC .".. BRiNKERHOFF, a marked man,
a l l as Joint Tenants with f u l l rights of survivorship,
and not as Tenants in Common,
Oi

5*729

anntMi
for t^ ^m of
-COLLARS.
C&unry,

• •

$10.00 & other valuable consideration
;** ioi;?w»^ i«cr :*2 tricfc of i*nd in
KANE
Suti o< Utin

J
S
*|
I
!

SEE SCHED'J.L "A" ATTACHED HERETO AND 3Y THIS REFERENCE WOE A PAP:7 H£3£0".

WITNESS, :?* h*nc

of u*c gnntor

thu

4 th

* ~tisL>L<~sJn si

S*9n«d »/i ;M P-««nci of
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ip;f»;ef ti'c.i .-ni
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June
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A C. 19 75

of :*i *tih»r. .-nr^rent *ho *u:> irir.c-w »c^d
$ nt
fA*cu:ec tiw>i a m i .
. ^tSL^k

Jaf^es B. Aoatr
« •

Otrior.aiiv

Els-e Brinke^noff, a widow,

.. ^ S . T > 7 _ Z '

-•-•-<<• « i ~

u^''&&\y*^cz'>'

Elsie Brinkerhoff

)
On I M

a*v Z*m~

. A. 0. 18 7 9 .

.-•€ IS... 1S79.

y> ;«.cmcf «

^

Ne:«> Pu&iic
J L ^ y J ^ ^ . ^

if^vsr"

E*Ub,> ft
4* Eb ^ k V f MO

PARTNERSHIP STATUTES

Utah Code Annotated 48-1-6 (1953) .
PARTNER AGENT OF PARTNERSHIP AS TO ' PARTNERSHIP
BUSINESS —
Every partner is an agent of the
partnership for the purpose of its business, and the
act of every partner, including the execution in the
partnership of any instrument for apparently carrying
on in the usual way the business of the partnership
of which he is a member, binds the partnership,
unless the partner so acting has in fact no authority
to act for the partnership in the particular matter
and the person with whom he is dealing has knowledge
of the fact that he has no such authority.

Utah Code Annotated 48-1-9 (1953) .
PARTNERSHIP CHARGED WITH KNOWLEDGE OF OR NOTICE TO
PARTNER —
Notice to any partner of any matter
relating to partnership affairs, and the knowledge of
the partner acting in the particular matter, acquired
while a partner or then present to his mind, and the
knowledge of any other partner who reasonably could
and should have communicated it to the acting
partner, operates as notice to or knowledge of the
partnership, except in the case of a fraud on the
partnership committed by or with the consent of that
partner.

